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Archive for the ‘Waiver of Privilege’ Category

(NJ) Employee’s Attorney-Client Privilege not Waived when Communication was made on a Company Computer

Posted by rjbiii on July 17, 2009

Attorneys at Ogletree Deakins post a case summary in which the court, among other things:

…specifically rejected the idea that a company’s ownership of a computer is the sole determinative factor in deciding whether an employee’s personal communications become the company’s property.

The case is: Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., No. A-3506-08T1 (App. Div., June 26, 2009)

Posted in Articles, email, Privacy, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Relion, Inc; Multiple failures lead to a waiver of privilege

Posted by rjbiii on April 10, 2009

[Post Process: the court applies FRE 502(b) for its analysis of a situation of inadvertent production]

On the basis of this evidence, I conclude that [Producing Party] has not carried its burden of disproving waiver. [Producing Party’s] discovery documents were inspected by attorneys and support staff…before they were produced… As the incident involving the re-exam file indicates, there was no surprise or deception on the part of [Requesting Party’s] counsel. [Counsel for Producing Party] not only had the opportunity to inspect the documents prior to the arrival of [Requesting Party’s] counsel, it had two additional opportunities to do so after [Requesting Party] had reviewed [Producing Party’s] documents, as [Requesting Party] provided [Producing Party’s] counsel with both hard copies and electronic, text-searchable copies of the documents [Requesting Party] had selected for copying. I conclude that [Producing Party] did not pursue all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the documents produced to [Requesting Party], and therefore that the privilege was waived. The fact that [counsel for Producing Party] did not intend to produce any privileged documents is not dispositive.

Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98400 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008 ).

Posted in 9th Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Or., FRE 502, Privilege, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

NJ Case Blurb: Stengart; Privilege waived when message to attorney created on company computer

Posted by rjbiii on April 9, 2009

The question posited is whether communication between an employee and her attorney through a personal, password protected, web-based E-mail account, but made on the employer’s computer, using and over the employer’s server, during business hours, is protected by the attorney client privilege, given employer’s provisions governing use of electronic communications with company issued equipment, resources and time. The Court finds that when an employee has knowledge of the employer’s electronic communication policy which adequately warns that any and all internet use and communication conducted on the employer’s computer is not private to the employee and warns that E-mail and voice mail messages, internet use and communication and computer files are considered part of the company’s business and client records, such communications are not protected by such attorney client privilege and are then not to be considered private or personal to any individual employee.

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., No. BER-L-858-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., March 6, 2009).

Posted in Case Blurbs-NJ, email, NJ, Privilege, State Courts, Waiver of Privilege | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

Case Summary: Heriot; Vendor Error resulting in Production of Privileged Documents did not Waive Privilege

Posted by rjbiii on April 1, 2009

Heriot v. Byrne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22552 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2009)

To assist them in complying with a production request, responding party hired a vendor to provide scanning and other services associated with discovery. The Vendor created a “master database” that responding party used to conduct their document review. Documents designated for production were then copied to a “production database,” where they would be “marked” with an appropriate confidentiality designation.

Responding party sent hard copy versions of immigration documents to the vendor with instructions to digitize the documents, load them into the Master Database, copy them to the Production Database, apply the appropriate confidentiality legend and bates numbers, and include them in the next production. The vendor, however, mistakenly exported not only the requested documents, but other, privileged documents as well. This resulted in the inadvertent production of privilege. The error was not in the instructions given to the vendor, but was in the vendor’s execution of those instructions. Requesting party then filed a motion

During the production, requesting party asked the responding party if any documents had been withheld due to privilege. Responding party answered in the negative. Responding party subsequently learned of the error, and informed opposing counsel while requesting the documents be destroyed. Opposing counsel destroyed all documents but one set, which it filed under seal with the court. They then filed motions with the court requesting, inter alia, that the court prevent the “claw back” of the documents and instead compel their production. Responding party asserted that the documents were privileged.

The court began its analysis by determining that FRE 502 applied to the case, and crafting a new protocol for deciding whether inadvertent production necessitates the waiver of privilege (see our case blurb here).
Based on the results of an in camera review, the court decided that the documents at issue were privileged, and that the crime-fraud exception does not apply.

The court applied FRE 502(b) by considering: 1) whether disclosure was inadvertent; 2) whether responding party took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and 3) whether responding party took prompt steps to rectify the inadvertent disclosure. The court noted that prior to the promulgation of the new rule, the burden rested with the party claiming privilege to prove its contentions. The court saw no reason to shift this burden.

In determining whether a production was inadvertent, the court weighed such factors as: the total number of documents reviewed, the procedures used to review the documents before they were produced, and the actions of producing party after discovering that the documents had been produced.

Additionally, the court examined “the extent of the disclosure” and “the scope of discovery,” while commenting that these two factors operated on a sliding scale: the broader the scope of the discovery, the more extensive a party’s disclosure of confidential materials may be without waiving the privilege, and vice versa. The court noted that the privileged documents comprised 5% of the volume of pages produced, and 13% of the volume of the documents produced, labeling these figures neither apoplectically large nor astonishingly small. The court described the extent of the disclosure as being “broad” and the magnitude of the percentages as “not insignificant.” Nevertheless, the court found other factors more significant for the purpose of its analysis, particularly the actions of the producing party upon discovering the mistake. Because the responding party took immediate action, the court decided that the first factor weighed in favor of responding party, concluding that the production was inadvertent. The court then addressed the second factor of its test, the party’s steps to remedy the inadvertent disclosure. Therefore, as long as reasonable procedures were in place prior to “turning the documents over to the vendors,” the responding party met its obligations. The court concluded, therefore, that responding party did take reasonable measures to prevent inadvertent production.

In beginning the second part of its three-step analysis, the court cited the advisory committee’s notes that it may, in making this determination, consider several factors, including “the number of documents to be reviewed and the time constraints for production”; whether “a party that use[d] advanced analytical software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product”; and whether “[t]he implementation of an efficient system of records management before litigation.” The court emphasized that the producing party was not required to engage in a post-production audit, although it was required to follow up on any obvious indications that a protected communication or information has been produced inadvertently.

In the third and final part of its analysis, the court stated that case law it unearthed stood for the proposition that how the disclosing party discovers and rectifies the disclosure is more important than when after the inadvertent disclosure the discovery occurs. In the case at bar, responding party discovered the error earlier than had the responding parties in the cases examined by the court, and were as diligent. In those cases, the disclosing parties were found to have acted appropriately. Therefore, the court found that Plaintiffs took prompt steps to rectify their inadvertent disclosure.

The court concluded that the responding party’s disclosure was inadvertent and that they did not waive the attorney-client privilege as to the Sequestered Documents.

Posted in 7th Circuit, Case Summary, EDD Vendors, FRE 502, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Ashman, Privilege, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Herriot; Court re-crafts protocol for privileged waiver on inadvertently produced documents (7th Cir.)

Posted by rjbiii on March 30, 2009

Ordinarily, disclosure of confidential information to an unprotected third party operates as a waiver. Under FRE 502, however, disclosure of privileged information will not operate as a waiver when “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).” All three elements described in FRE 502 must be satisfied to prevent a waiver.

Plaintiffs argue that “[FRE] 502 is applicable to this case[,] and Defendants offer no reason why it would not be ‘just and practicable’ to apply [FRE] 502 to this case as in every other case.” Defendants argue that this Court should apply the three-part inquiry quoted in Judson. The Judson test requires the court to decide (1) whether the disclosed material was privileged, (2) whether the disclosure was inadvertent, and (3) whether the privilege was waived.

There is no question that FRE 502 applies to this case. The 2008 Amendment clearly stated that FRE 502 applies to matters pending on September 19, 2008, “insofar as is just and practicable.” This matter was pending on that date, and this Court finds no reason, and Defendants have pointed to none, that precludes the application of FRE 502.

[…]

To properly assess whether FRE 502(b) overrides Judson, this Court examines each step of the Judson test.

The first step of the Judson test requires the court to determine whether the documents at issue are privileged. This step must remain in place under FRE 502(b), which applies only to privileged information that was inadvertently disclosed. Prior to addressing any of the elements stated in FRE 502(b), therefore, the court must determine whether the documents are privileged. If the documents are not privileged, the inquiry ends. If the documents in question are privileged, then FRE 502(b) applies, and the court must determine whether each of FRE 502(b)’s elements was satisfied. The first element of FRE 502(b), which also is the second step of the Judson test, requires the court to assess whether the party’s disclosure was inadvertent. Therefore, this Court will assess whether a disclosure is inadvertent. FN6

FN6: Inadvertence under FRE 502(b) is not necessarily the same as, and does not necessarily mirror the case law describing, inadvertence under Judson.

Defendants also urge this Court to adopt Judson’s third step, which requires the court to determine, using a “balancing approach,” whether a waiver occurred despite the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. The balancing approach requires the court to consider “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness.”

That tack, however, has been at least partially foreclosed by Congressional action. FRE 502 specifically states that inadvertent disclosure “does not operate as a waiver in a Federal . . . proceeding.” In other words, the second and third steps of the Judson test have been folded into the entire FRE 502(b) inquiry. FRE 502 does not, however, prohibit the use of the Judson factors. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (noting that the non-dispositive factors a court may consider “are the reasonableness of precautions taken, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure and the overriding issue of fairness”). Thus, while “[FRE 502(b)] is flexible enough to accommodate any of those listed factors,” it “does not explicitly codify [the Judson] test[] because [the factors it uses are] a set of non-determinative guidelines that vary from case to case.” Therefore, the court may, but need not, use some or all of the Judson factors to assess whether FRE 502(b)’s requirements have been satisfied.

This Court therefore adopts the following test. First, a court determines whether the disclosed material is privileged. If it is not, the inquiry ends. If the material is privileged, the court applies FRE 502(b). If the court concludes that disclosing party satisfied all of the elements in FRE 502(b), the privilege is not waived. If, however, the disclosing party fails to satisfy any of the FRE 502 elements, the privilege is waived. In applying FRE 502(b), the court is free to consider any or all of the five Judson factors, provided they are relevant, to evaluate whether each element of FRE 502(b) has been satisfied. FN7.

FN7: One court has applied FRE 502(b) in a rather peculiar fashion, choosing to adopt the factors articulated in the committee’s note as a wholesale test of inadvertent disclosure. Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 218-27 (E.D. Penn. 2008). Strangely, using only the Judson factors to determine the waiver question eliminates any need to consult the elements required under FRE 502. Such an approach would ignore a Congressional mandate and substitute judicial holdings for legislation. Therefore, this Court concludes that a better approach focuses on the elements required by FRE 502 and uses the Judson factors, where appropriate, to supplement this analysis.

Heriot v. Byrne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22552 at *16-(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2009) (internal citations removed)

Posted in 7th Circuit, Case Blurbs, FRE 502, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Ashman, N.D. Ill., Privilege, Waiver of Privilege | 1 Comment »

WA Case Blurb: Sitterson; Test for determining Waiver of Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure

Posted by rjbiii on December 31, 2008

In adopting the Alldread approach, states the test has the following factors:

These factors are (1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure, (2) the amount of time taken to remedy the error, (3) the scope of discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) the overriding issue of fairness.

Sitterson v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2751 at *17 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008 )

Posted in Attorney Client Privilege, Case Blurbs-WA, State Courts, WA Judge David H. Armstrong, Waiver of Privilege, Washington | Leave a Comment »

Case Summary: Rhoads Indus.; Attorney Client Privilege, the Waiver of Privilege, and Reasonable Precautions

Posted by rjbiii on December 8, 2008

Case Summary: Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93333 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2008 )

In a question of the adequacy of a keyword screening protocol, the court entertains a motion to deem plaintiff had waived privilege as to approximately 800 inadvertently produced documents. Rhoads filed the action against Bldg. Materials Corp. of America (“GAF”) for, inter alia, breach of contract, and against R.W. Cooper & Co. (“Cooper”) for negligent misrepresentation.

Rhoads began preparing for the litigation in February, 2007. In June 2007, upon realizing that e-discovery would be extensive in the case, he hired Salvatore Gramaglia as an IT expert. Mr. Gramaglia, after conducting tests, Mr. Gramaglia purchased a license for “Discovery Attender” to be used in electronic searches. Mr. Gramaglia and Kimberly Buchinsky, an associate at Gowa Lincoln P.C., began identifying mailboxes containing relevant information to Rhoads’ project with GAF. The court stated that “Gramaglia and Buchinsky reasonably believed that the computer program would screen out all privileged materials.” Efforts to settle the dispute were unsuccessful, and on November 13, 2008, Rhoads filed the complaint. Discovery commenced shortly thereafter. Sam Washawer, a was bought in by Rhoads for the litigation. He discussed the scope of e-discovery with Mr. Gramaglia and Ms. Buchinsky, and observed the performance of Discovery Attender. He also conferred with Gramaglia and Buchinsky over the topic of search terms for searches.

During January and February of 2008, Gramaglia performed searches using terms supplied by counsel, initially identifying 210,635 documents as “being responsive.” His priv filter consisted of searching the “address line of all e-mails for these terms: *rhoadsinc* and either *gowa*, *ballard*, or *cpmi*. “Gowa” and “Ballard” represents Rhoads’ law firms, while “CPMI” refers to a non-testifying expert for plaintiff. This search resulted in the designation of 2,000 documents as “privileged,” although they were not placed on a privilege log at that time.

In response to the large volume of documents initially returned, counsel narrowed the responsive search criteria, reducing the total documents returned to 78,000 that plaintiff believed were responsive and non-privileged. Ms. Buchinsky then manually reviewed documents from specific mailboxes for privilege. She removed certain documents from the production, and entered them on a privilege log. Meanwhile, counsel also reviewed twenty-two boxes of hard copy documents for responsiveness and privilege.

On May 13, 2008, Rhoads produced to Δ’s, three hard drives containing responsive electronic documents, including the 78,0000 documents returned by the responsive “screen.”

On June 6, 2008, Rhoads produced two privilege logs to Δ’s, in response to a court order. One log was associated with Ms. Buchinsky’s manual review, while the other contained hard copy documents.

On June 5, 2008, Δ’s GAF notified Π’s counsel that some privileged e-mails may have been produced. Π immediately responded by asserting that no privilege had been waived, and that this was likely a case of inadvertent production. Over the next two and a half weeks, Π then conducted nine depositions and responded to Δ Cooper’s Motion to Dismiss before addressing the privilege issue.

On or about June 23, 2008, Ms. Buchinsky began reviewing the 78,000 e-mails produced as a result of the responsive searches executed in Discovery Attender. She generated a new privilege log identifying 812 emails as privileged, producing it to Δ’s on June 30, 2008 as an attachment to a letter invoking FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) to have Δ’s sequester the inadvertently produced documents.

On August 19, 2008, Δ Cooper filed a Motion to Deem that Plaintiff had waived the Privilege to the approximately 800 documents. Δ GAF filed a motion joining Cooper’s motion on August 25, 2008. Defendants did not dispute that the production was inadvertent and that the software purchased by Rhoads was designed to ferret out privileged documents. Defendants did argue that Rhoads’s technical consultant and counsel were not sufficiently careful to review the software screening and to take steps to prevent disclosure when it appeared obvious that privileged material had filtered through the screening procedure.

On November 5, 2008, the first hearing on the waiver of privilege was conducted. All three privileged logs were produced. Mr. Gramaglia and Ms. Buchinsky testified as to the method of creation of the logs, and their relationship to each other. Rhoads admitted that 2,000 e-mails previously designated as privilege had not yet been disclosed in a privilege log. Ms. Buchinsky testified to her belief that a manual review of all 78,000 emails would have resulted in the timely identification of those documents in a privilege log. The court then ordered that any documents not on a privilege log as of the date of that hearing should be produced, absent exceptional circumstances.

After the hearing, Rhoads inspected the 2,000 documents earlier set aside, but not identified in a log, as privilege. The results of this inspection were discussed on a hearing on November 13, 2008. Rhoads concluded that 941 documents were duplicative. Of the 1059 unique documents, 511 were responsive, consisting of 335 privileged documents and 176 non-privileged documents. Of the 335 privileged documents, 215 had been previously identified in other logs. Rhoads agreed to produce the 176 responsive non-privileged documents, and generated a fourth privilege log. The court expressed its opinion that Rhoads might still retain privileged and un-logged documents.

The court then weighed the facts using the five factor test laid out in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1996). These factors are:

(1) The reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of the document production.
(2) The number of inadvertent disclosures.
(3) The extent of the disclosure.
(4) Any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosure.
(5) Whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving the party of its errors.

On the first factor (reasonableness taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure), the court found that the following factors favored the plaintiff (producing party):

1. Plaintiff purchased a special software program, Discovery Attender, for the purposes of complying with discovery in this litigation.
2. Plaintiff’s technical consultant (Mr. Gramaglia) conducted trial searches prior to purchasing the software and was satisfied with its reliability and accuracy.
3. Mr. Gramaglia was experienced with Rhoads’s computer system.
4. Plaintiff believed that its search terms would pick up all attorney-client communication.
5. Plaintiff did not use “Warshawer” or “Costello” (outside counsel) as search terms because counsel believed Gowa was included on all e-mails going to the client.
6. Plaintiff did not include “privileged” or “confidential” as keyword search terms because all Rhoads e-mails use these words in the signature line at the bottom of every e-mail, and thus use of these words would have identified every Rhoads document as privileged.
7. Ms. Buchinsky spent over 40 hours reviewing documents for privilege before production. Additional attorneys spent significant hours on the privilege review.

The court found the following factors favored defendants (requesting parties):

1. Plaintiff should have used additional search terms to weed out potentially privileged documents, especially the names of all of its attorneys. Here the court cited Bensel v. Air Line Pilot Ass’n, 248 F.R.D. 177, 180 (D.N.J. 2008).
2. Ms. Buchinsky had no prior experience doing a privilege review and her supervising attorneys did not provide any detailed oversight.
3. Plaintiff’s search for privileged documents was limited to e-mail address lines (as opposed to the e-mail body). Therefore any potentially privileged e-mails (as defined by Plaintiff’s search terms) that were subsequently forwarded outside of Rhoads and either Gowa, Ballard, or CPMI would not be captured by its search.
4. Plaintiff produced documents that its limited search should have caught. Therefore Plaintiff not only failed to craft the right searches, but the searches it ran failed. Plaintiff has no explanation for this.
5. As Stanley notes, relying exclusively on a keyword search for the purpose of conducting a privilege review is risky, and proper quality assurance testing is a factor in whether precautions were reasonable. Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 257, 260. Here there was no testing of the reliability or comprehensiveness of the keyword search.
6. Plaintiff’s only testing of its search was to run the same search again

On the second factor, the number of inadvertent documents produced, the court found this fact favored plaintiffs:

1. The number of documents inadvertently produced represent a small percentage (1-2%) of the total production.

The court found these facts weighed in favor of defendants:

1. 800 inadvertently produced documents plus at least 120 privileged documents that this Court now orders be produced is still a large number of documents regardless of the percentage produced.
2. The court in Stanley found that 165 documents was a sufficiently large number to favor waiver of the privilege.

The court stated that nothing in the record indicated whether the third factor (the extent of the disclosure) weighed in favor of one party over the other.

On the fourth factor (Any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosure), the court found these facts favored plaintiffs:

1. Plaintiff immediately responded to Defendant’s e-mail that some potentially privileged documents had been produced by stating that production was inadvertent and inquiring which documents Defendant was referring to;
2. As relied on in Fidelity, Plaintiff was under a tight discovery schedule at the time it was notified of the inadvertent production. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 168 F.R.D. at 522. Ms. Buchinsky was helping prepare for nine depositions taken over the course of twelve days. Plaintiffs also had to respond to Defendant Cooper’s Motion to Dismiss during this time.
3. Plaintiff invoked the remedial measure of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) to have the inadvertently produced documents sequestered at the same time it produced the June 30th privilege log (Ex. D-1), three weeks after learning of the disclosure.
4. Plaintiff was willing to produce a cleansed hard drive (i.e. without the privileged documents) to Defendants in September, but Defendants refused the hard drive.
5. Defendant did not file their Motion to Deem that the Privilege was Waived until two months after Plaintiff produced the June 30th privilege log.

Those facts favoring defendants:

1. Plaintiff had abundant time to review its own documents and segregate any privileged documents before it started the litigation and also before it began producing documents in May 2008;
2. The crunch and time pressure that Plaintiff claims it suffered in June 2008 were caused by Plaintiff not providing adequate resources (e.g. attorneys or paralegals) to the privileged communication issue;
3. Defendants had to bring Plaintiff’s error to its attention instead of Plaintiff catching its own mistake (cites Victor Stanley).
4. It took Plaintiff over three weeks to produce a privilege log of the inadvertently produced documents once it was aware of its mistake.
5. The June 30th privilege log required Defendants to cross-reference each document produced to them against the log to check whether documents were in fact privileged. Plaintiff did not offer Defendants a cleansed hard drive until September.
6. Plaintiffs did not offer suggestions to rectify the inadvertent production until October, after many depositions had been taken.

On the final factor (Whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving the party of its errors), the court found these facts weighed in favor of the plaintiffs:

1. Plaintiff has shown general compliance with the three conditions of Rule 502, although considering the factors in the prior case law, Plaintiff is responsible for the confusion and delay noted above;
2. The loss of privilege would be highly prejudicial to the Plaintiff;
3. Defendants have not demonstrated substantial unfairness that they have suffered because of their inability to review the privileged documents beyond having to cross-reference documents against the June 30th privilege log.

Favoring defendants:

1. Plaintiff should have conducted a more rigorous privilege review and allowing Plaintiff to retain the privilege in these documents may not deter similar conduct in the future.

The court then concluded its opinion by ruling the following:
Those documents that were never logged after designation (part of the 2000 e-mails initially designated as privileged, but not listed in a privilege log until after the Nov. 5 hearing) were not subject to protection, as a failure to identify privilege documents in a log in a timely manner violates FRCP 26(b)(5).

With respect to the documents that were inadvertently produced, the court stated that neither Victor Stanley or Amersham were controlling. The court stated that although the facts in Victor Stanley were similar to those in the instant matter, Judge Grimm’s analysis reflects, to a more significant degree than [the court] believe[s] appropriate, application of hindsight, which should not carry much weight, if any, because no matter what methods an attorney employed, an after-the-fact critique can always conclude that a better job could have been done. The court found that factors one through four favored defendants, while the fifth strongly supported plaintiffs. As defendants have the burden of proof as the moving party, the court concluded that this burden had not been met, and privilege was not waived for these documents.

Posted in 3d Circuit, Attorney Client Privilege, Case Summary, E.D. Pa., Judge Michael M. Baylson, Privilege, Privilege Log, Search Protocols, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

Effects of New FRE 502 discussed

Posted by rjbiii on October 6, 2008

Attorneys from Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker LLP have posted an article discussing inadvertent disclosure and its effect on privilege under new FRE 502:

Under the Rule, parties can create the waiver rules that govern the proceeding, and those rules will be binding on third parties and in state proceedings.

How does the rule work? The article explains:

Under the new Rule 502(a), inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a subject matter waiver. Intentional disclosure of protected information in a federal proceeding or to a federal agency will operate as a subject matter waiver only if: (1) the waiver is intentional, (2) the undisclosed material covers the same subject matter as the materials that were disclosed, and (3) the materials “ought in fairness to be considered together.” Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 502(a). Thus, subject matter waiver is “reserved for those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary.” Advisory Committee Explanatory Note to Rule 502(a).

The article contains an interesting prediction on the bottom-line results of the new rule:

The Rule will reduce the costs of privilege review associated with large e-discovery productions, and will limit the impact of intentional and inadvertent disclosures of attorney-client communications and attorney work product (collectively “protected information”).

If true, then the E-Discovery World just got a little less frightening…

Posted in Articles, FRE 502, Trends, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

House passes Proposed FRE 502

Posted by rjbiii on September 15, 2008

Last Monday, the House passed the proposed rule, which is designed to protect parties against the inadvertent disclosure of privileged material, and the waiver of the privilege because of the disclosure.

The rule takes effect on any new matters, and to the extent that is “just and practicable,” on any matters currently pending. The text of the rule can be found here (pdf), and the congressional record, containing legislative intent, is here (also pdf).

Posted in FRE 502, Legislation, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Creative Pipe; Factors for the Intermediate Balancing Test for examining whether privilege has been waived

Posted by rjbiii on June 15, 2008

The intermediate test requires the court to balance the following factors to determine whether inadvertent production of attorney-client privileged materials waives the privilege: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) overriding interests in justice.

[The Producing Party]…bear[s] the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable for purposes of assessing whether they waived attorney-client privilege…

Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 2008 WL 2221841 at *5 (D.Md. May 29, 2008 ) (omitting internal citations).

Posted in 4th Circuit, Attorney Client Privilege, Case Blurbs, D. Md., Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm, Waiver of Privilege | Leave a Comment »