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Case Summary: Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., On Spoliation and Info. Management

Posted by rjbiii on July 5, 2009

Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26964 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2009)

FACTS: Plaintiffs, and requesting party, Philip M. Adams & Associates, alleged infringement of their patents for technology that detected and resolved defects in the most widely used floppy disk controller, thus preventing data from being destroyed. The patents in question were purportedly assigned to plaintiffs by the original inventor. FDC-related defects gave rise to multiple lawsuits, culminating with the settlement of a class action suit against Toshiba in October of 1999.
Requesting party accused producing party of spoliation, as stated in the opinion:

…first, that ASUS has illegally used Adams’ patented software; and second, that ASUS has destroyed evidence of that use. The first assertion is identical to the liability issue in this case. The second assertion is premised on the first: Assuming ASUS used Adams’ software, ASUS’ failure to produce evidence of that use is sanctionable spoliation. Adams has no direct proof of destruction of evidence but is inferring destruction or withholding of evidence. Since Adams is convinced that ASUS infringed, Adams is also convinced that failure to produce evidence of infringement is sanctionable.

Issues we examine:

  1. When did the producing party’s duty to preserve attach?
  2. How does the Safe Harbor provision (FRCP 37(e)) factor into the determination of sanctions in this case?
  3. What role does producing party’s information management system play in the sanctions calculus?
  4. How does the producing party’s lack of produced data on certain subjects in the aggregate balanced against the absence of specific evidence of wrong-doing by requesting party?

Issue 1: Court’s reasoning:
Producing party acknowledges receiving a letter from requesting party’s counsel asserting infringement on February 23, 2005. It does not acknowledge receiving an earlier letter dated October 4, 2004. Thus, Producing Party dates the beginning of its duty to preserve from the date of the February letter, and states that it has complied with that duty from that time forward. Producing party takes the position that a delay in giving notice and bringing suit by requesting party is the reason for the lack of available data from the years 2000 and 2001.
The court noted that both parties agreed that “a litigant’s duty to preserve evidence arises when ‘he knows or should know [it] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.'” The court acknowledged the producing party’s stance that this trigger occurred upon receiving counsel’s letter, but stated that this was “not the inviolable benchmark.” The court cited 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 2006) to buttress its argument.
In 103 Investors, the defendant disposed of 50 to 60 feet of “busway” material after a fire had occurred, destroying all but four feet of the busway, and eliminating any of the busway that should have contained a warning label. The court concluded that in that instance, the defendant should have known that litigation was imminent, although the material had been disposed of long before the complaint was filed.
The court described the history of this defect. In 1999 Toshiba paid a large sum to settle a class action related to the floppy drive error in play in the instant matter. That same year, a class action suit was filed against HP for the same defect. In 2000, producing party was working on correcting the issue. Sony became embroiled in a class action in 2000. The court stated that the industry had (or should have become) “sensitized” to the possibility of litigation on this issue.

It appears that this extends the duty to preserve, which is already among the more difficult and costly issues in e-discovery today. By extending the duty’s trigger to occur prior to any direct or specific action against defendants, the court is asking too much of any IT department. It may be that the lack of documents produced by the defendants (this is discussed below) puts the court in the position of trying to fashion a rationale for punishment. But taken literally, the effects of the opinion could set a difficult, perhaps impossible, standards for compliance with the duty.

Issue 2: Safe Harbor?

The court, to the dismay of many commentators, dismisses the effects of the safe harbor provision in FRCP 37(e). Ralph Losey claims the court “mines” the rule into oblivion. I think what is in play here is that the court feels that the producing party would use Safe Harbor as a rationale for not producing data that it should have. Nevertheless, Safe Harbor’s reach, already attenuated, appears to weaken further in this opinion.


Issue 3: What role does producing party’s information management system play in the sanctions calculus?

The court comes down hard on the IG practices of the producing party. It stated that the system’s architecture, possessed of questionable reliability, should not be excused, though it evolved, rather than was deliberately designed to operate as it does. The result is that it operated to deprive the requesting party of access to evidence.
Traits of this system are described thusly:
[Producing Party] extensively describes its email management and storage practices, to explain the nearly complete absence of emails related to the subject of this litigation.

First, [Producing Party] says its email servers are not designed for archival purposes, and employees are instructed to locally preserve any emails of long term value.

[Producing Party] employees send and receive email via company email servers.

Storage on [Producing Party’s] email servers is limited, and the company directs employees to download those emails they deem important or necessary to perform their job function from the company email server to their individual company issued computer.

[Producing Party] informs its employees that any email not downloaded to an employee’s computer are automatically overwritten to make room for additional email storage on ASUSTeK ‘s servers.

It is [Producing Party’s] routine practice that its employees download to their individual computer those emails the employee deems important or necessary to perform his or her job function or comply with legal or statutory obligations.

Second, ASUS employee computers are periodically replaced, at which time ASUS places all archiving responsibility for email and other documents on its employees. During the course of their employment, ASUSTeK employees return their individual company issued computers in exchange for newer replacement computers.

40. The hard drives of all computers returned to or exchanged with the company are formatted to erase all electronic information stored on these computers before they are recycled, reused or given to charity.

41. During a computer exchange, it is [Producing Party’s] practice to direct its employees to download those emails and electronic documents from the employee’s individual computer to the employee’s newly issued computer that the employee deems important or necessary to perform his or her job function or comply with legal or statutory obligations.

The court stated that descriptions these data management practices may explain why relevant e-mails were not produced, but it did not establish the Producing Party’s good faith in managing its data. It calls the information management practices of the producing party “questionable” and that although an organization may design its systems to suit its business purposes, the information management practices are still accountable to such third parties as adversaries in litigation. The court opines that: “[a] court – and more importantly, a litigant – is not required to simply accept whatever information management practices a party may have. A practice may be unreasonable, given responsibilities to third parties.

Furthermore, while the court accepts that the Producing Party’s system “evolved” rather than was purposefully designed with the goal of hiding data needed for litigation, it nevertheless quoted the Sedona Conference: “An organization should have reasonable policies and procedures for managing its information and records.”

Finally, the court took aim at the practice of allowing individual users to drive retention practices, when it stated: “[Producing Party’s]’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs.”

Issue 4: How does the producing party’s lack of produced data on certain subjects in the aggregate balanced against the absence of specific evidence of wrong-doing by requesting party?

Producing Party turned over executable files of their own invention, but failed to surrender the source code for those executables. They also failed to produce other relevant executables and related source code, or “a single document” relating to the development of the applications under scrutiny. The court expressed concern over the absence of certain types of documents from the production:

[Producing Party’s] only response is that it has produced a large volume of documents. That may be the case; but, it has not produced the most critical documents – those that relate to its misappropriation, its copying, and its willful behavior. The only conclusion after all this time is that [Producing Party] has destroyed critical evidence that it simply cannot show did not exist.

By this expression, the court adopted Requesting Party’s argument that Producing Party had “‘spoliated the most critical evidence in this case, e.g., test programs and related source code’ “[S]ince [Producing Party] has not produced it, the only conclusion is that [they have destroyed it.”

The court also noted, in its analysis of Producing Party’s objection to the admissibility of data produced by third parties on grounds of authentication, that the Producing Party, while claiming “a near total absence of evidence…[sought] to eliminate the only evidence available. The court concluded that such tactics should not prevail to “prevent consideration of the best evidence available.”

Requesting Party listed types of documentation that they would expect Producing Party to possess, but never received during production. Communications and documentation from outside sources contributed to a suspicion that such documentation once existed. Indeed, as the court examines the Producing Party’s duty to preserve, it leads off by stating: “[t]he universe of materials we are missing is very large. Indisputably, we have very little evidence compared to what would be expected.”

In dismissing arguments that destruction of the data in question was covered by the “Safe Harbor” provision under FRCP 37(e), the court stated: “[o]ther than the patent application and the executable file, it does not appear [Producing Party] has produced any significant tangible discovery on the topics where information is conspicuously lacking.”

Ultimately the court found that Producing Party had breached its duty to preserve relevant data. It appears from the information above that the dearth of critical documentation from the Defendant’s productions was a significant contributor to the ruling, but the court does not explain the weight to which it assigned this as an element in its ruling.

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Posted in 10th Circuit, Best Practices, Case Summary, D. Utah, Data Custodians, Data Management, Data Retention Practices, Document Retention, Duty to Preserve, FRCP 37(e), Good Faith, Information Governance, Magistrate Judge David Nuffer, Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation, Safe Harbor, Source Code, Spoliation | 1 Comment »

Blogging LegalTech West 2008: Litigation Holds

Posted by rjbiii on June 29, 2008

The second, and for me last, presentation of the day was “Ready…Set…Preserve: Navigating the Legal Hold Process and Technology. The panel consisted of Patrick Oot of Verizon, Kraft’s Chief Counsel Theodore Banks, and American Electric Power’s Kamal Kamara.

The rule of thumb that triggers a legal hold is (say it with me class), the date when litigation may be reasonably anticipated. The very last date that can be justified for the issuance of a legal hold is the date the complaint is actually filed. The first step to implementing a legal hold is to determine the identity of the key players. However, before the hold is even necessary, some preemptive actions should have been addressed. Litigation readiness best practices suggest that record management training for all employees is important. These rules apply:

  1. The guidelines employees study must be related to their jobs.
  2. Information on how to comply with relevant policies should be easy to find. They should have access to manuals, or intranet web sites with the necessary guidelines.
  3. Training should be consistent, and reinforced periodically.

The purpose of the legal hold is to stop destruction of potentially responsive information, identify that data, and save it. Employees should understand the consequences of failing to comply, and where to get help when they have questions.

Mr. Banks explained that for Kraft, the legal hold was triggered later than would be appropriate for some others, because of the nature of the complaints his company confronted, and the design of its information system. Much of the data needed was historical information that was preserved anyway, often for reasons of compliance with federal retention laws.

Mr. Kamara described his company’s home-built lit hold solution as being similar to e-vite. All three companies used custom built solutions rather than “off the shelf” products.

Some important points: acknowledgment by recipients is an essential component to a lit hold system; audit trails and the availability of reports is important.

I enjoyed this presentation more than the previous session. The panelists were good, but I also got to see screenshots of various systems, which I found interesting. The next step now is to see how technology can be used not only to issue notice of a hold, but to also take action to prevent actual destruction of information.

Posted in Best Practices, Data Custodians, Document Retention, Duty to Preserve, Industry Events, Litigation Hold, Trends | 1 Comment »

TX Case Blurb: Honza; Court addresses objection to discovery request based on revealing confidential information, court order

Posted by rjbiii on March 10, 2008

[Producing Party members] seek a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Honorable Greg Wilhelm, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, to set aside a discovery order requiring the Honzas to permit a forensic expert to create a mirror image of each of the computer hard drives in the Honzas’ office in an effort to locate two particular documents or iterations of those documents

The Honzas contend that Respondent abused his discretion because: (2) the order authorizes the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (3) the order authorizes the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to the Honzas’ other clients who have no connection to the underlying lawsuit.

The present discovery dispute originated with [Requesting Party’s] motion to gain access to the Honzas’ computers, which was filed about one month before trial. By this motion, [Requesting Party] sought “[i]nformation (the ‘Metadata’) contained on the actual computers of the Defendants, such as any time stamps on the Relevant Documents, versions of the Relevant Documents, if any, as well as the deletion of various versions, if any.” [Requesting Party] explained that, although the Honzas responded to a prior request for production of relevant documents in their electronic version, “the Metadata was neither produced nor made available.”

[Ed. Testimony indicated the existence of relevant documents with respect to a another transaction apparently not addressed by earlier discovery requests]

[] [Requesting Party] sought discovery of relevant documents pertaining to the [newly revealed] transaction, and the [Producing Party] complied by providing pertinent written discovery.

[Requesting Party] seeks the metadata from the [Producing Party’s] hard drives because it wants to identify the points in time when the partial assignment draft was modified in relation to the diary entry. This goes to the issue of whether [the Producing Party] altered the partial assignment after the parties concluded their agreement but before the document was presented for execution.

[Ed. The opinion then went on to list various Federal and State sources for persuasive authority in discovery law, especially with respect to ESI]

Privileged or Confidential Information

The [Producing Party] also contend[s] that the discovery order improperly authorizes the disclosure of (1) information protected by the attorney-client privilege and (2) confidential information pertaining to the Honzas’ other clients who have no connection to the underlying lawsuit.

Notwithstanding the “unlimited” access necessarily granted the forensic expert, Respondent’s order preserves any privileged or confidential information in several ways. First, the expert is limited in his search to two specific documents or iterations of those documents. [Members of the Producing Party] are then accorded the right to review the documents and information which the expert believes responsive and produce to [Requesting Party] only those documents and information which [members of the Producing Party] themselves believe are responsive. These provisions effectively preclude [Requesting Party] from having any access to documents or information pertaining to other clients of the Honzas not involved in this litigation.

Second, the order allows the [Producing Party executives] to withhold from discovery any documents or information which they claim to be privileged or confidential and provide instead a privilege log, subject to in camera review by Respondent.

Finally, the order provides that: (1) the observation of information by [Requesting Party] representatives during the imaging process shall not constitute a waiver of privilege or confidentiality; (2) all participants in the imaging process are subject to a protective order prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of information; and (3) [Requesting Party’s] expert must provide proof of being bonded and of having commercial liability insurance by which the [Producing Party] may be “fully indemnified against any monetary loss.”

For these reasons, we hold that Respondent appropriately tailored the discovery order to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of privileged or confidential information and no abuse of discretion is shown.

[Ed. Note that a dissenting opinion is also entered by one of the Judges hearing the case. See the order itself for the full text of that dissent, or of the opinion itself.]

In re Honza, 2007 WL 4591917 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2007)

Posted in Case Blurbs, Computer Forensics, Data Collection, Data Custodians, Data Sources, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Objections to Discovery Requests, Privacy, Privilege, Privilege Log, Scope of Discovery, Texas, TX Judge Felipe Reyna | Leave a Comment »

TX Case Blurb: Honza; Court addresses objection to ‘overly broad’ discovery requests, court order

Posted by rjbiii on March 10, 2008

[Producing Party members] seek a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Honorable Greg Wilhelm, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, to set aside a discovery order requiring the Honzas to permit a forensic expert to create a mirror image of each of the computer hard drives in the Honzas’ office in an effort to locate two particular documents or iterations of those documents

The Honzas contend that Respondent abused his discretion because: (1) the discovery order is overbroad and authorizes an improper “fishing expedition”;…

The present discovery dispute originated with [Requesting Party’s] motion to gain access to the Honzas’ computers, which was filed about one month before trial. By this motion, [Requesting Party] sought “[i]nformation (the ‘Metadata’) contained on the actual computers of the Defendants, such as any time stamps on the Relevant Documents, versions of the Relevant Documents, if any, as well as the deletion of various versions, if any.” [Requesting Party] explained that, although the Honzas responded to a prior request for production of relevant documents in their electronic version, “the Metadata was neither produced nor made available.”

[Ed. Testimony indicated the existence of relevant documents with respect to a another transaction apparently not addressed by earlier discovery requests]

[] [Requesting Party] sought discovery of relevant documents pertaining to the [newly revealed] transaction, and the [Producing Party] complied by providing pertinent written discovery.

[Requesting Party] seeks the metadata from the [Producing Party’s] hard drives because it wants to identify the points in time when the partial assignment draft was modified in relation to the diary entry. This goes to the issue of whether [the Producing Party] altered the partial assignment after the parties concluded their agreement but before the document was presented for execution.

[Ed. The opinion then went on to list various Federal and State sources for persuasive authority in discovery law, especially with respect to ESI]

Overbroad Discovery

The [Producing Party] first contend that the discovery order is overbroad and authorizes an improper “fishing expedition.” In this regard, they argue that Respondent improperly “gave blanket approval for [the Requesting Party] to gain total access to [their] computers and all information stored on them, whether or not it has anything to do with this lawsuit.”

Although it is true that Respondent’s order gives A & W’s forensic expert [FN8]complete access to all data stored on the Honzas’ computers, the order provides that the expert is to index all forensic images acquired from the imaging process “for the limited purpose of searching (the ‘Examination Process’) for two documents, previously Bates-labeled as HONZA 00019 and HONZA 00017, which are drafts of “Assignment of Contract” and any iterations (the ‘Relevant Documents’).” The expert must then compile any documents or information which the expert believes responsive and deliver them to the Honzas to determine for themselves which are responsive to A & W’s discovery request and which they choose to withhold, providing a privilege log instead.

In addition to limiting the expert’s search to two specific documents, the order provides that no waiver of privilege or confidentiality occurs if any otherwise privileged or confidential information is observed by A & W’s counsel or representatives during the imaging process, and they are prohibited from using such information other than in compliance with the terms of the order. The forensic expert is likewise prohibited from disclosing any information observed during the imaging process. And finally, the order requires the expert and all party representatives or counsel participating in the imaging process to sign an acknowledgment agreeing that they are subject to contempt of court for any violation of the order.

Any order requiring the imaging of a computer hard drive necessarily grants the expert who is conducting the imaging process access to all data on that hard drive. Here, Respondent specifically limited the expert’s search to two documents; gave the [Producing Party] a “right of first refusal” with regard to determining which documents or information are relevant to those two documents and responsive to [Requesting Party’s] discovery request; imposed stringent limitations on inadvertent disclosures to prevent any unintended waiver of confidentiality or privilege; and placed all participants in the imaging process under a carefully drawn protective order.

Therefore, we do not agree with the Honzas’ contention that the discovery order is overbroad.

[Ed. Note that a dissenting opinion is also entered by one of the Judges hearing the case. See the order itself for the full text of that dissent, or of the opinion itself.]

In re Honza, 2007 WL 4591917 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2007)

Posted in Case Blurbs, Computer Forensics, Data Custodians, Data Sources, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Form of Production, Objections to Discovery Requests, Overly Broad Request, Privacy, Scope of Discovery, State Courts, Texas, TX Judge Felipe Reyna | Leave a Comment »

TX Case Blurb: Honza; Court outlines process for Forensic Expert’s access to Party’s hard drive and subsequent production

Posted by rjbiii on March 10, 2008

[Producing Party members] seek a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Honorable Greg Wilhelm, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, to set aside a discovery order requiring the Honzas to permit a forensic expert to create a mirror image of each of the computer hard drives in the Honzas’ office in an effort to locate two particular documents or iterations of those documents

The Honzas contend that Respondent abused his discretion because: (1) the discovery order is overbroad and authorizes an improper “fishing expedition”; (2) the order authorizes the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (3) the order authorizes the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to the Honzas’ other clients who have no connection to the underlying lawsuit.

The present discovery dispute originated with [Requesting Party’s] motion to gain access to the Honzas’ computers, which was filed about one month before trial. By this motion, [Requesting Party] sought “[i]nformation (the ‘Metadata’) contained on the actual computers of the Defendants, such as any time stamps on the Relevant Documents, versions of the Relevant Documents, if any, as well as the deletion of various versions, if any.” [Requesting Party] explained that, although the Honzas responded to a prior request for production of relevant documents in their electronic version, “the Metadata was neither produced nor made available.”

[Ed. Testimony indicated the existence of relevant documents with respect to a another transaction apparently not addressed by earlier discovery requests]

[] [Requesting Party] sought discovery of relevant documents pertaining to the [newly revealed] transaction, and the [Producing Party] complied by providing pertinent written discovery.

[Requesting Party] seeks the metadata from the [Producing Party’s] hard drives because it wants to identify the points in time when the partial assignment draft was modified in relation to the diary entry. This goes to the issue of whether [the Producing Party] altered the partial assignment after the parties concluded their agreement but before the document was presented for execution.

[Ed. The opinion then went on to list various Federal and State sources for persuasive authority in discovery law, especially with respect to ESI]

Under these decisions, the following protocol is generally followed. First, the party seeking discovery selects a forensic expert to make a mirror image of the computer hard drives at issue. This expert is required to perform the analysis subject to the terms of a protective order, generally prohibiting the expert from disclosing confidential or otherwise privileged information other than under the terms of the discovery order.

After creating the mirror images and analyzing them for relevant documents or partial documents, courts typically require the expert to compile the documents or partial documents obtained and provide copies to the party opposing discovery. That party is then to review the documents, produce those responsive to the discovery request, and create a privilege log for those withheld. Finally, the trial court will conduct an in-camera review should any disputes arise regarding the entries in the privilege log.

Because our research has disclosed no Texas decisions regarding this type of electronic discovery, we will apply these fairly uniform procedures to the issues presented in this proceeding.

[Ed. Note that a dissenting opinion is also entered by one of the Judges hearing the case. See the order itself for the full text of that dissent, or of the opinion itself.]

In re Honza, 2007 WL 4591917 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2007)

Posted in Case Blurbs, Computer Forensics, Data Collection, Data Custodians, Duty to Produce, Objections to Discovery Requests, Privacy, Privilege, Privilege Log, Scope of Discovery, State Courts, Texas, TX Judge Felipe Reyna | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Lorraine; ESI may be authenticated by witness with personal knowledge of the data

Posted by rjbiii on September 17, 2007

Courts considering the admissibility of electronic evidence frequently have acknowledged that it may be authenticated by a witness with personal knowledge. Lorraine v. Markel Amer. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).

  • (referencing United States v. Kassimu, 2006 WL 1880335 (5th Cir. May 12, 2006) (ruling that copies of a post office’s computer records could be authenticated by a custodian or other qualified witness with personal knowledge of the procedure that generated the records));
  • (referencing St. Luke’s, 2006 WL 1320242 at *3-4 (“To authenticate printouts from a website, the party proffering the evidence must produce ‘some statement or affidavit from someone with knowledge [of the website] … for example [a] web master or someone else with personal knowledge would be sufficient.’ ” (citation omitted)))
  • (referencing Safavian, 435 F.Supp.2d at 40 n. 2 (D.D.C.2006) (noting that e-mail may be authenticated by a witness with knowledge that the exhibit is what it is claimed to be));
  • (referencing Wady, 216 F. Supp 2d 1060 (sustaining objection to affidavit of plaintiff’s witness attempting to authenticate documents taken from the defendant’s website because the affiant lacked personal knowledge of who maintained the website or authored the documents)).

Posted in 3d Circuit, 4th Circuit, Admissibility of ESI, Authentication, Case Blurbs, D. Md., Data Custodians, FRE 901, Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Lorraine; Data Custodian’s personal knowledge of a specific file not necessary for authentication under FRE 901(b)(1)

Posted by rjbiii on September 17, 2007

Although Rule 901(b)(1) certainly is met by the testimony of a witness that actually drafted the exhibit, it is not required that the authenticating witness have personal knowledge of the making of a particular exhibit if he or she has personal knowledge of how that type of exhibit is routinely made.

It is necessary, however, that the authenticating witness provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so, as opposed to boilerplate, conclusory statements that simply parrot the elements of the business record exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6), or public record exception, Rule 803(8). Lorraine v. Markel Amer. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).

Posted in 3d Circuit, Admissibility of ESI, Authentication, Case Summary, D. Md., Data Custodians, FRE 901(b)(1), Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb; WestLB AG; Key Players have a duty to preserve relevant documents

Posted by rjbiii on August 28, 2007

The scope of the duty [to preserve relevant documents] extends to the “key players” in a litigation. Quinby v. WESTLB AG, 2006 WL 2597900 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Posted in 2nd Circuit, Case Blurbs, Data Custodians, Data Sources, Duty to Preserve, Key Players, S.D.N.Y | Leave a Comment »