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Case Summary: Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., On Spoliation and Info. Management

Posted by rjbiii on July 5, 2009

Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26964 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2009)

FACTS: Plaintiffs, and requesting party, Philip M. Adams & Associates, alleged infringement of their patents for technology that detected and resolved defects in the most widely used floppy disk controller, thus preventing data from being destroyed. The patents in question were purportedly assigned to plaintiffs by the original inventor. FDC-related defects gave rise to multiple lawsuits, culminating with the settlement of a class action suit against Toshiba in October of 1999.
Requesting party accused producing party of spoliation, as stated in the opinion:

…first, that ASUS has illegally used Adams’ patented software; and second, that ASUS has destroyed evidence of that use. The first assertion is identical to the liability issue in this case. The second assertion is premised on the first: Assuming ASUS used Adams’ software, ASUS’ failure to produce evidence of that use is sanctionable spoliation. Adams has no direct proof of destruction of evidence but is inferring destruction or withholding of evidence. Since Adams is convinced that ASUS infringed, Adams is also convinced that failure to produce evidence of infringement is sanctionable.

Issues we examine:

  1. When did the producing party’s duty to preserve attach?
  2. How does the Safe Harbor provision (FRCP 37(e)) factor into the determination of sanctions in this case?
  3. What role does producing party’s information management system play in the sanctions calculus?
  4. How does the producing party’s lack of produced data on certain subjects in the aggregate balanced against the absence of specific evidence of wrong-doing by requesting party?

Issue 1: Court’s reasoning:
Producing party acknowledges receiving a letter from requesting party’s counsel asserting infringement on February 23, 2005. It does not acknowledge receiving an earlier letter dated October 4, 2004. Thus, Producing Party dates the beginning of its duty to preserve from the date of the February letter, and states that it has complied with that duty from that time forward. Producing party takes the position that a delay in giving notice and bringing suit by requesting party is the reason for the lack of available data from the years 2000 and 2001.
The court noted that both parties agreed that “a litigant’s duty to preserve evidence arises when ‘he knows or should know [it] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.'” The court acknowledged the producing party’s stance that this trigger occurred upon receiving counsel’s letter, but stated that this was “not the inviolable benchmark.” The court cited 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 2006) to buttress its argument.
In 103 Investors, the defendant disposed of 50 to 60 feet of “busway” material after a fire had occurred, destroying all but four feet of the busway, and eliminating any of the busway that should have contained a warning label. The court concluded that in that instance, the defendant should have known that litigation was imminent, although the material had been disposed of long before the complaint was filed.
The court described the history of this defect. In 1999 Toshiba paid a large sum to settle a class action related to the floppy drive error in play in the instant matter. That same year, a class action suit was filed against HP for the same defect. In 2000, producing party was working on correcting the issue. Sony became embroiled in a class action in 2000. The court stated that the industry had (or should have become) “sensitized” to the possibility of litigation on this issue.

It appears that this extends the duty to preserve, which is already among the more difficult and costly issues in e-discovery today. By extending the duty’s trigger to occur prior to any direct or specific action against defendants, the court is asking too much of any IT department. It may be that the lack of documents produced by the defendants (this is discussed below) puts the court in the position of trying to fashion a rationale for punishment. But taken literally, the effects of the opinion could set a difficult, perhaps impossible, standards for compliance with the duty.

Issue 2: Safe Harbor?

The court, to the dismay of many commentators, dismisses the effects of the safe harbor provision in FRCP 37(e). Ralph Losey claims the court “mines” the rule into oblivion. I think what is in play here is that the court feels that the producing party would use Safe Harbor as a rationale for not producing data that it should have. Nevertheless, Safe Harbor’s reach, already attenuated, appears to weaken further in this opinion.


Issue 3: What role does producing party’s information management system play in the sanctions calculus?

The court comes down hard on the IG practices of the producing party. It stated that the system’s architecture, possessed of questionable reliability, should not be excused, though it evolved, rather than was deliberately designed to operate as it does. The result is that it operated to deprive the requesting party of access to evidence.
Traits of this system are described thusly:
[Producing Party] extensively describes its email management and storage practices, to explain the nearly complete absence of emails related to the subject of this litigation.

First, [Producing Party] says its email servers are not designed for archival purposes, and employees are instructed to locally preserve any emails of long term value.

[Producing Party] employees send and receive email via company email servers.

Storage on [Producing Party’s] email servers is limited, and the company directs employees to download those emails they deem important or necessary to perform their job function from the company email server to their individual company issued computer.

[Producing Party] informs its employees that any email not downloaded to an employee’s computer are automatically overwritten to make room for additional email storage on ASUSTeK ‘s servers.

It is [Producing Party’s] routine practice that its employees download to their individual computer those emails the employee deems important or necessary to perform his or her job function or comply with legal or statutory obligations.

Second, ASUS employee computers are periodically replaced, at which time ASUS places all archiving responsibility for email and other documents on its employees. During the course of their employment, ASUSTeK employees return their individual company issued computers in exchange for newer replacement computers.

40. The hard drives of all computers returned to or exchanged with the company are formatted to erase all electronic information stored on these computers before they are recycled, reused or given to charity.

41. During a computer exchange, it is [Producing Party’s] practice to direct its employees to download those emails and electronic documents from the employee’s individual computer to the employee’s newly issued computer that the employee deems important or necessary to perform his or her job function or comply with legal or statutory obligations.

The court stated that descriptions these data management practices may explain why relevant e-mails were not produced, but it did not establish the Producing Party’s good faith in managing its data. It calls the information management practices of the producing party “questionable” and that although an organization may design its systems to suit its business purposes, the information management practices are still accountable to such third parties as adversaries in litigation. The court opines that: “[a] court – and more importantly, a litigant – is not required to simply accept whatever information management practices a party may have. A practice may be unreasonable, given responsibilities to third parties.

Furthermore, while the court accepts that the Producing Party’s system “evolved” rather than was purposefully designed with the goal of hiding data needed for litigation, it nevertheless quoted the Sedona Conference: “An organization should have reasonable policies and procedures for managing its information and records.”

Finally, the court took aim at the practice of allowing individual users to drive retention practices, when it stated: “[Producing Party’s]’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs.”

Issue 4: How does the producing party’s lack of produced data on certain subjects in the aggregate balanced against the absence of specific evidence of wrong-doing by requesting party?

Producing Party turned over executable files of their own invention, but failed to surrender the source code for those executables. They also failed to produce other relevant executables and related source code, or “a single document” relating to the development of the applications under scrutiny. The court expressed concern over the absence of certain types of documents from the production:

[Producing Party’s] only response is that it has produced a large volume of documents. That may be the case; but, it has not produced the most critical documents – those that relate to its misappropriation, its copying, and its willful behavior. The only conclusion after all this time is that [Producing Party] has destroyed critical evidence that it simply cannot show did not exist.

By this expression, the court adopted Requesting Party’s argument that Producing Party had “‘spoliated the most critical evidence in this case, e.g., test programs and related source code’ “[S]ince [Producing Party] has not produced it, the only conclusion is that [they have destroyed it.”

The court also noted, in its analysis of Producing Party’s objection to the admissibility of data produced by third parties on grounds of authentication, that the Producing Party, while claiming “a near total absence of evidence…[sought] to eliminate the only evidence available. The court concluded that such tactics should not prevail to “prevent consideration of the best evidence available.”

Requesting Party listed types of documentation that they would expect Producing Party to possess, but never received during production. Communications and documentation from outside sources contributed to a suspicion that such documentation once existed. Indeed, as the court examines the Producing Party’s duty to preserve, it leads off by stating: “[t]he universe of materials we are missing is very large. Indisputably, we have very little evidence compared to what would be expected.”

In dismissing arguments that destruction of the data in question was covered by the “Safe Harbor” provision under FRCP 37(e), the court stated: “[o]ther than the patent application and the executable file, it does not appear [Producing Party] has produced any significant tangible discovery on the topics where information is conspicuously lacking.”

Ultimately the court found that Producing Party had breached its duty to preserve relevant data. It appears from the information above that the dearth of critical documentation from the Defendant’s productions was a significant contributor to the ruling, but the court does not explain the weight to which it assigned this as an element in its ruling.

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Posted in 10th Circuit, Best Practices, Case Summary, D. Utah, Data Custodians, Data Management, Data Retention Practices, Document Retention, Duty to Preserve, FRCP 37(e), Good Faith, Information Governance, Magistrate Judge David Nuffer, Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation, Safe Harbor, Source Code, Spoliation | 1 Comment »

Case Blurb: Cunningham; Court Discusses Requests for Admissions

Posted by rjbiii on August 13, 2008

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, Plaintiff’s Motion requests that the Court determine the sufficiency of Defendant’s objections to the RFAs. Pursuant to Rule 36(a)(1)(A), “[a] party may serve upon any other party a written request to admit . . . the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; . . . .” The responding party may specifically admit, deny, or qualify an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). Absent court permission to withdraw or amend, admissions are binding on a party in the pending action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Furthermore, Rule 36 allows parties to object to a request for admission so long as the grounds for objection are stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(5). If an objection is justified, the party is not required to admit or deny the truth of the matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6).

The purpose of Rule 36 is to reduce trial time by facilitating proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case and by narrowing the issues that must be proved at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 Advisory Committee’s note. Essentially, requests for admission “expedite trials by establishing as true certain material facts of a case without the necessity of formal proof at trial.” Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 554 (10th Cir. 1978 ). Because requests for admission establish the truth of the matter, they “are not to be treated as substitutes for discovery processes to uncover evidence, and that they may not be applied to controverted legal issues lying at the heart of the case.” Cal. v. The Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1955); see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998 ) (quoting 8A Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2252 at 524-525 (2d ed. 1994) (Rule 36 “presupposes that the party proceeding under it knows the facts.”)).

As a general rule, parties should use requests for admission to elicit simple and direct answers. Herrera v. Scully, 143 F.R.D. 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). “Compound, complex, and vague [requests for admission] are prone to . . . objection.” William W. Schwarzer et al., Civil Discovery and Mandatory Disclosure: A Guide to Efficient Practice, 5-6 (2d ed. 1994). For example, requests for admission that are overly broad or vague as to time or scope are properly objectionable. FTC v. Think All Publ’g L.L.C., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18561, 2008 WL 687454, *4 (E.D. Tex. March 11, 2008 ) (unpublished decision). In addition, requests for admission relating to the truth of a legal conclusion are properly objectionable, even though Rule 36 permits the application of law to fact. Utley v. Wray, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68413, 2007 WL 2703094, *3 (D. Kan. September 14, 2007) (citing Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006)). Specifically, “requests for admissions of law which are related to the facts of the case are considered to be inappropriate.” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. V. Am. Home Assur. Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997).

Cunningham v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52518, 3-6 (D. Colo. May 29, 2008 ).

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Colo., FRCP 36, FRCP 36(a), FRCP 36(b), Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix, Request for Admissions | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Cunningham; Court Examines Motion Accusing Party of ‘Failing to Confer’

Posted by rjbiii on August 13, 2008

As a preliminary matter, counsel disagree on whether Plaintiff satisfied the duty to confer pursuant to D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.1(A). Plaintiff’s certification asserts that counsel made reasonable, good-faith efforts to resolve Defendant’s objections to the Requests for Admission (“RFA”) before filing the Motion with the Court. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(A), the Court will not consider a nondispositive motion unless the movant, prior to filing, has conferred or made reasonable, good-faith efforts to confer with opposing counsel to resolve the dispute. To confer means to “discuss, talk over, consult about,” or “to hold conference.” See Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Accordingly, the language of Local Rule 7.1(A) suggests that parties confer by “hold[ing] a conference, possibly through the exchange of correspondence but preferably through person-to-person telephone calls or face-to-face meetings, and [by] compar[ing] views and attempt[ing] to reach an agreement, including by compromise if appropriate.” Hoelzel v. First Select Corp., 214 F.R.D. 634, 636 (D. Colo. 2003). If both parties have not discussed and compared views in an attempt to reach an agreement, the movant must at least make reasonable, good-faith efforts to do so. The Court judges the reasonableness of movant’s good-faith efforts by considering not only the sheer quantity of contacts, but also their quality. Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 456, 459 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that four phone calls and two letters did not satisfy the duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to confer).

On March 24, 2008, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed Defendant a single letter that requested that Defendant reconsider its objections to the RFAs. This letter did not threaten filing the Motion if Defendant failed to respond immediately. See id. Plaintiff offers no evidence of Defendant’s response to this letter, if any. Only seven days later, on March 31, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Motion. This is insufficient evidence of a good-faith attempt to confer pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(A). The Court notes that it would be permissible to deny the Motion on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to confer pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(A). However, the Court declines to deny the Motion on that basis and will decide it on the merits. Counsel are warned that a failure to confer in the future will result in summary denial of any motion. Cunningham v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52518, 1-3 (D. Colo. May 29, 2008 ) (internal citations to pleadings removed).

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Colo., Good Faith, Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix, Meet and Confer | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

Case Blurb: Cunningham; Relevancy, and Who has the Burden to Prove it

Posted by rjbiii on July 21, 2008

[P]ursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), any discovery sought must be relevant. Relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be considered if there is “any possibility” that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689-90 (D.Kan.2001). “When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure .” Simpson v. University of Colorado, 220 F.R.D. 354, 350 (D.Colo.2004) (citations omitted). Further, the objecting party cannot “sustain this burden with boilerplate claims that the requested discovery is oppressive, burdensome or harassing.” Id. (citation omitted). However, when a request for discovery is overly broad on its face or when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.

Cunningham v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2668301 (D. Colo. July 1, 2008 )

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Colo., Discovery Requests, FRCP 26(b), Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix, Objections to Discovery Requests, Overly Broad Request, Relevance | Leave a Comment »

Guidelines (D. Kan.) for topics to discuss at 26(f) meet and confer

Posted by rjbiii on October 4, 2007

During the [26(f)] conference, the parties should confer regarding the following matters:

  • [ESI] in general. Counsel should attempt to agree on steps the parties will take to segregate and preserve [ESI] in order to avoid accusations of spoliation.
  • E-mail information. Counsel should attempt to agree on the scope of e-mail discovery and e-mail search protocol.
  • Deleted information. Counsel should attempt to agree on whether responsive deleted information still exists, the extent to which restoration of deleted information is needed and who will bear the costs of restoration.
  • Embedded data and metadata. Embedded data typically refers to draft language, editorial comments, and other deleted matter retained by computer programs. Metadata typically refers to information describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic file. The parties should discuss at the [conference] whether embedded data and metadata exist, whether it will be requested or should be produced, and how to handle determinations regarding privilege or protection of trial preparation materials.
  • Back-up and archival data. Counsel should attempt to agree on whether responsive back-up and archival data exists, the extent to which back-up and archival data is needed, and who will bear the cost of obtaining such data.
  • Format and media. Counsel should attempt to agree on the format and media to be used in the production of [ESI].
  • Reasonably accessible information and costs. The volume of, and ability to search, [ESI] means that most parties discovery needs will be satisfied from reasonably accessible sources. Counsel should attempt to determine if any responsive [ESI] is not reasonably accessible, i.e., information that is only accessible by incurring undue burdens or costs. If the responding party is not searching or does not plan to search sourced containing potentially responsive information, it should identify the category or type of such information. If the requesting party intends to seek discovery of [ESI] from sources identified as not reasonably accessible, the parties should discuss:
    • The burdens and costs of accessing and retrieving the information;
    • The needs that may establish good cause for requiring production of all or part of the information, even if the information sought is not reasonably accessible; and
    • Conditions on obtaining and producing this information such as scope, time and allocation of cost.
  • Privileged or trial preparation materials. Counsel should attempt to reach an agreement regarding what will happen in the event privileged or trial preparation materials are inadvertently disclosed. If the disclosing party inadvertently produces privileged or trial preparation materials, it must notify the requesting party of such disclosure. After the requesting party is notified, it must return, sequester, or destroy all information and copies and may not use or disclose this information until the claim of privilege or protection as trial preparation materials is resolved.
    • The parties may agree to provide a “quick peek,” whereby the responding party provides certain requested materials for initial examination w/o waiving any privilege or protection.
    • The parties may also establish a clawback agreement, whereby materials that are disclosed w/o intent to waive privilege or protection are not waived and are returned to the responding party, so long as the responding party identifies the materials mistakenly produced
    • Other voluntary agreements should be considered as appropriate. The parties should be aware that there is an issue of whether such agreements bind third parties who are not parties to the agreements.
  • Duty to meet and confer when requesting [ESI] from non-parties (Fed. R. Civ. P. 45). Parties issuing requests for electronically stored information from non-parties should attempt to informally meet and confer with the non-party (or counsel, if represented). During this meeting, counsel should discuss the same issues with regard to requests for [ESI] that they would with opposing counsel as set forth ..above.

U.S. Dist. Cts. (Kan), Guidelines for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information. [pdf]

Posted in 10th Circuit, D. Kan., FRCP 26(f), Meet and Confer | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

Case Summary: Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., 2007 WL 2225946 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2007); Court denies motion to compel production of hard drive

Posted by rjbiii on September 26, 2007

In this employment discrimination case, Magistrate Judge Gerald Rushfelt denied defendant’s request to compel the plaintiff to “produce the hard drive of her personal computer for inspection and copying.” In response to defendants’ discovery requests, some of which sought correspondence between plaintiff and defendant National American University or her students at the university, plaintiff produced one e-mail. After defendant informed plaintiff that it believed her responses to the discovery requests were deficient, and after agreeing to supplement those responses, Ms. Benton declared that all e-mails from her students had been deleted, and therefore could not produced. She also resisted producing her hard drive, as requested by defendants.

Defendants argued that Ms. Benton failed to “produce[] any e-mail communications that took place after February 2007,” and that they believe she had been deleting those emails relating to her employment since that date. Defendants contended that because Ms. Benton had admitted to deleting some emails, and because she had only produced one e-mail dated after February 2007, she must have destroyed other relevant documents.

The court disagreed. Defendants were speculating as to the whether plaintiff complied with their discovery requests, and have not met their burden to support their contentions of spoliation. The court refused to assume the plaintiff’s failure to comply. Therefore, the court denied the motion, and any calls for sanctions, without prejudice to any future motion should further discovery show that plaintiff did, in fact, fail to produce responsive documents or had spoliated relevant evidence.

Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., 2007 WL 2225946 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2007)

K&L Gates has the full text of the opinion here, as well as their own summary here.

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Summary, D. Kan., Discovery, Discovery Requests, Form of Production, Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Rushfelt, Motion to Compel | Leave a Comment »

Case Summary: Kraft Foods N. Am.; Discovery request for documents over a 7 year period not overly broad

Posted by rjbiii on September 11, 2007

Court ruled that a discovery request seeking documents from January 1, 1999 to [April 7, 2006] did not represent an overly broad temporal scope. Although the “last discriminatory act” for the purposes of the action at bar would have occurred in April 2004, information from the two-years and three-months prior to the April 2002 liability period may be relevant to demonstrate the pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct alleged by Plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants provided no evidence that production of documents for this twenty-seven month period would impose any burden on defendants.

Court ruled “not overly broad” in departmental or organizational scope discovery requests seeking documents relating to “sales representatives” and “region managers” in the Kraft Sales Organization over the objection of the responding party. Responding party had argued that because no plaintiffs had ever held the position of regional manager, individuals in those positions were not similarly situated to Plaintiffs, making the documents irrelevant to the matter at hand. The court disagreed, finding that the requests were not overly broad on their face; that defendant’s lack of assertion to demonstrate that discovery would impose a burden; and that although the title of “region manager” no longer exists, responding party should produce documents of the position regardless of its new title.

Court ruled discovery requests seeking documents for the “Kansas City Region” were not overly broad in geographic scope, because the motives behind employment decisions made by managers at the regional level were relevant to the matter at hand. Because the some of the wrongdoing was alleged to have occurred at a regional level within defendant’s organizational structure, the court found defining the geographic scope of the requests as the Kansas City region is reasonable. Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 238 F.R.D. 648 (D. Kan 2006).

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Summary, D. Kan., Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse, Overly Broad Request, Scope of Discovery | Leave a Comment »

Case Summary: Ponca Tribe Indians; Discovery Request for data in a proprietary format denied

Posted by rjbiii on September 11, 2007

In a case concerning numerous allegations concerning the operation of a carbon black production plant, the court determined that the discovery request of all data maintained by an application named the “Data Historian” imposed an undue burden on the producing party, and was overly broad. Producing party had established its right to object by demonstrating that the expense of providing the information sought outweighed any benefit it might provide requesting party, while the requesting party failed to put forward a sufficient argument their need for the information within the data historian outweighed the burden of production.

The data historian, a proprietary software package not licensed to the requesting party, recorded data from 719 data points in one minute increments. Requesting party had refused producing party’s suggestion the requesting party could, using a key provided by producing party, identify specific data points to review, thereby “greatly reducing the volume of information sought.” Likewise, the requesting party refused to narrow their search by identifying relevant time and date periods, as suggested by the producing party. Requesting party argued that using these narrowing techniques wasn’t feasible, but they “offered no evidence demonstrating the basis for this conclusion.” Therefore, requesting party’s request to image or download the data base from the data historian was denied. However, to the extent that the requesting party express a willingness to purchase the necessary software and pay for the necessary programming, and post a bond suggested by producing party, the court will revisit the issue should the parties still be unable to agree on their own. The Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Continental Carbon Co., 2006 WL 2927878 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2006).

Posted in 10th Circuit, Case Summary, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Judge Robin J. Cauthron, Scope of Discovery, Undue burden or cost | Leave a Comment »

Guideline (D. Kan): Form of Production

Posted by rjbiii on August 29, 2007

Parties and counsel are reminded that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, if the requesting party has not designated a form of production in its request, or if the responding party objects to the designated form, then the responding party must state in its written response the form it intends to use for producing electronically stored information. U.S. Dist. Cts. (Kan), Guidelines for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information.

Posted in 10th Circuit, D. Kan., Discovery Requests, Form of Production, FRCP 34 | Leave a Comment »