Case Blurb: Collins & Aikman Corp.; Deliberative Process Privilege discussed

The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure “‘documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’” The privilege is intended “‘to enhance the quality of agency decisions, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government.’”

In order to qualify for the privilege, a document must be “predecisional” and “deliberative.” A document is predecisional if it was “‘prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.’” The agency claiming privilege “must be able to demonstrate that . . . the document for which . . . privilege is claimed related to a specific decision, facing the agency.” Moreover, the privilege does not extend to “‘purely factual’ material” or subjective discussions insofar as they were later adopted or incorporated in a final agency opinion. A document is deliberative if it is “‘actually . . . related to the process by which policies are formulated.’” Factors used to determine whether a document is deliberative include “whether the document ‘(i) formed an essential link in a specified consultative process, (ii) reflects the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency, and (iii) if released, would inaccurately reflect or prematurely disclose the views of the agency.”

SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009)(internal citations removed).

Case Blurb: Collins & Aikman Corp.; Form of Document Production for Gov’t Entities Conducting Investigations

Under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party has two options for the production of documents in response to a discovery request. The litigant may either produce documents “as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request.” The Advisory Committee Note states that the purpose of this new rule language — added in 1980 — was to eliminate the practice of “‘deliberately [mixing] critical documents with others in the hope of obscuring significance.’” Allowing the production of documents as they “are actually kept in the usual course of business” was intended to minimize the burden of production while maintaining the “internal logic reflecting business use.”

Rule 34 does not elaborate on the term “usual course of business.” A party choosing to produce documents as maintained in the ordinary course of business “bears the burden of demonstrating that the documents made available were in fact produced consistent with that mandate.” In most cases, documents produced pursuant to Rule 34 will be organized by subject matter or category. The provision prohibits “simply dumping large quantities of unrequested materials onto the discovering party along with the items actually sought.”

The SEC [(producing party)] contends that even if the compilations are not protected as work product, it has the option of producing the complete, unfiltered, and unorganized investigatory file, as this is how the documents are maintained in the usual course of its business. As noted above, Rule 34 mandates that documents must be produced organized by the subjects of the request or organized as they are kept in the usual course of business by the producing party. The key to this dichotomy is the assumption that in either case the documents will be organized — that records kept in the usual course of business would not be maintained in a haphazard fashion. Thus regardless of the form chosen, the production will be useful to the requesting party, and neither choice will inject unnecessary time and cost into litigation.

In order to determine what constitutes an appropriate production of records as they are kept in the “usual course of business,” it is first necessary to define that term. To begin with, not every litigant is a business or functions in the manner of a business. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a business as “[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain.” Only as a secondary definition, business constitutes “[b]y extension, transactions or matters of a noncommercial nature.”
[...]
By rough analogy to Rule 803(6), the option of producing documents “as they are kept in the usual course of business” under Rule 34 requires the producing party to meet either of two tests. First, this option is available to commercial enterprises or entities that function in the manner of commercial enterprises. Second, this option may also apply to records resulting from “regularly conducted activity.” Where a producing party’s activities are not “routine and repetitive” such as to require a well-organized record-keeping system — in other words when the records do not result from an “ordinary course of business” — the party must produce documents according to the sole remaining option under Rule 34: “organize[d] and label[ed] . . . to correspond to the categories in the request.”

The logic of Rule 34 supports this limitation. When records do not result from “routine and repetitive” activity, there is no incentive to organize them in a predictable system. The purpose of the Rule is to facilitate production of records in a useful manner and to minimize discovery costs; thus it is reasonable to require litigants who do not create and/or maintain records in a “routine and repetitive” manner to organize the records in a usable 55 fashion prior to producing them.

However conducting an investigation — which is by its very nature not routine or repetitive — cannot fall within the scope of the “usual course of business.” While the SEC routinely collects and maintains regulatory submissions such 10-K reports, in its investigative capacity the agency conducts tailored probes of a company or an industry, requiring the gathering of records from diverse sources. Many if not most of the 1.7 million documents in the SEC production here were likely collected in the agency’s investigatory role. Thus it is no surprise that the complete collection is maintained as it was collected — in large disorderly databases. The documents can only be provided in a useful manner if the agency organizes or labels them to correspond to each demand. Based on the SEC’s submission, it appears that this has already been done through the lead litigation attorney’s creation of the 175-plus file folders at issue.

Therefore, the SEC must respond to [Requesting Party's] request for production by providing him with the documents that respond to those requests. [Requesting Party] has not requested the SEC file folders as such, but many of them correlate with the factual allegations in the Complaint, the subjects of the requests. Thus, to the extent that one or more of the 175 folders assembled by the SEC’s attorneys constitute the complete set of documents relevant to a particular request…

SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009)(internal citations removed).

Case Blurb: Ahner; Fact that Producing Party is Testifying Witness Magnifies Need for Disclosure During Discovery

[Producing Party] argues…Rule 26(b)(4) precludes the [Requesting Party] from seeking information from it by subpoena because it is [Plaintiff's] retained expert and its former employee, Nickie G. Cammarata, has been listed as an expert trial witness by [Plaintiff]. On the contrary, [Producing Party's] status as a party’s testifying expert makes it more important, not less, that the facts and documents underlying its opinions be disclosed in response to a valid discovery request.

Indeed, Rule 26(a)(2) provides that parties must initially disclose, without awaiting a discovery request, the identity of any expert witness, “the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; [and] any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions.” Although this court’s scheduling order altered the deadline imposed by the Federal Rules by which parties must provide their expert reports, underlying data and exhibits, neither that order nor Rule 26(b)(4) precludes the [Requesting Party] from propounding a subpoena duces tecum that seeks such underlying information as already exists. Rule 26(b)(4) only restricts when a party may depose its opponent’s testifying and non-testifying experts or propound interrogatories to its opponent’s non-testifying experts; it does not limit document requests.

Auto Club Family Ins. Co. v. Ahner, 2007 WL 2480322 at *3 (E.D.La. Aug. 29, 2007) (internal citations removed)

Case Blurb: Thai Heng Chang; Court discusses documents produced across matters

The Court agrees generally that Defendant should not have to produce documents he has already produced, whether in another cause or not, but he may not simply refer Plaintiff to the other lawsuit with the general objection that he’s already produced responsive documents. Defendant must respond to each discovery request served in this case and identify each responsive document by Bates number or other identifying information that specifies the precise document. Of course, any responsive documents between March 22, 2007, and July 1, 2007, would not be previously produced in response to the subpoena, and therefore, shall now be produced within ten days of this date.

Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Thai Heng Chang, 2008 WL 4098329 at *2 (N.D.Fla. Aug. 29, 2008 ) (emphases in the original).

Case Blurb: Thai Heng Chang; Court orders immediate production of e-mail from previously undisclosed account

Post Process: The court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel, and motion to impose sanctions for inadequate discovery. The court delayed determination of appropriate sanctions until a later date. Below is an excerpt of the opinion, discusses Defendant’s undisclosed yahoo e-mail account.

At issue are [inter alia]: emails from the account edsmith1818@yahoo.com…
Plaintiff contends that it only recently learned of another email account used by the Defendant that should have been identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, which Plaintiff served upon Defendant on November 6, 2007. Plaintiff contends that Defendant should supplement his document production to include these emails, which it alleges contain highly relevant information crucial to the issues raised in this case.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant used this specific email account to engage in the activities upon which this entire lawsuit is based. Defendant represents to Plaintiff and the Court that he cannot produce the emails because they have been destroyed by Yahoo! He offers a copy of a generic response from Yahoo! regarding deactivating accounts, but Plaintiff has attached to its motion a copy of a letter from Defendant’s counsel to Yahoo! regarding a subpoena served in the Georgia case for the hankchang138@yahoo.com account. Nothing in that letter indicates a problem with Yahoo! complying with a subpoena for emails in that account despite Defendant’s assertion that they had been deleted. Perhaps Yahoo! has a process for obtaining emails from deactivated accounts as well. Regardless, the Court does not at this time accept Defendant’s explanation that production of these documents is “impossible,” particularly given the important evidentiary value of these emails and the feeble offering by Defendant in support of his contention. The Court further finds that Defendant’s representation that he was being “completely truthful” when he did not identify this account because he knew it would be impossible to ultimately produce these emails, to be sanctionable. It will figure largely into the sanctions ultimately awarded in this matter if it is learned that Defendant’s failure to identify this account earlier is the cause of the alleged impossibility.

As an initial matter, Defendant shall immediately make all possible efforts to obtain the emails in account edmith1818@yahoo.com and shall then produce all documents in this account without further objection or delay…The Court will not accept Defendant’s position that he cannot produce these emails until assurance is given from an executive at Yahoo! responsible for such tasks that this request is indeed impossible.

Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Thai Heng Chang, 2008 WL 4098329 at *1 (N.D.Fla. Aug. 29, 2008 ).

Case Blurb: Nursing Home Pension Fund; Court discusses ‘legal control’ of evidence

[Requesting Party] additionally allege[s] that defendants failed to preserve or destroyed documents created in preparation for a book entitled Softwar: An Intimate Portrait of Larry Ellison and Oracle (“Softwar” ). The book was written by Matthew Symonds, an author and editor with The Economist, who conducted at least 135 hours of recorded interviews between March 2001 and August 2002 with defendant Ellison. In October 2006, plaintiffs moved to compel defendants to produce the transcripts and audio files of these Softwar interviews. Defendants argued that the materials were not in their custody or control, and Symonds also asserted that the materials were his sole property. On January 2, 2007, Special Master Infante determined that although such materials were in the physical possession of Symonds, Ellison had legal control of them pursuant to a contract between Symonds and Ellison. Winkler Decl. ex. 194. As a result, Special Master Infante ordered defendants to produce copies of “any interview notes, transcripts or tape recordings relating to the book.” Id. at 4. Shortly thereafter, it was revealed that Symonds no longer had the materials in question, and it appears that Symonds may have discarded the laptop computer containing the transcripts and audio files after he learned of plaintiffs’ motion to compel.

Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 2008 WL 4093497 at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2008).

Case Blurb: YouTube; Court Denies Motion to Compel Production of “Private” Videos and Related Data-For the Most Part

Private Videos and Related Data

YouTube.com users may override the website’s default setting–which makes newly added videos available to the public–by electing to mark as “private” the videos they post to the website. Plaintiffs move to compel production of copies of all those private videos, which can only be viewed by others authorized by the user who posted each of them, as well as specified data related to them.

Defendants are prohibited by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.) from disclosing to plaintiffs the private videos and the data which reveal their contents because ECPA § 2702(a)(2) requires that entities such as YouTube who provide “remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents” of any electronic communication stored on behalf of their subscribers, FN8 and ECPA § 2702 contains no exception for disclosure of such communications pursuant to civil discovery requests.

FN8:The prohibition against divulgence of stored subscriber communications set forth in ECPA § 2702(a)(2) applies only “if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing” (id. § 2702(a)(2)(B)), but defendants satisfy that condition here because their authorization to access and delete potentially infringing private videos is granted in connection with defendants’ provision of alleged storage services.

Plaintiffs claim that users have authorized disclosure of the contents of the private videos pursuant to ECPA § 2702(b)(3) (remote computing service providers “may divulge the contents of a communication * * * with the lawful consent of * * * the subscriber”) by assenting to the YouTube website’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, which contain provisions licensing YouTube to distribute user submissions (such as videos) in connection with its website and business, FN9 disclaiming liability for disclosure of user submissions, FN10 and notifying users that videos they divulge online in the public areas of the website may be viewed by the public.

FN11 None of those clauses can fairly be construed as a grant of permission from users to reveal to plaintiffs the videos that they have designated as private and chosen to share only with specified recipients.

FN9: “However, by submitting User Submissions to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive * * * license to * * * distribute * * * the User Submissions in connection with the YouTube Website and YouTube’s (and its successors’ and affiliates’) business.” This authorizes YouTube to post the video on the website; the privacy designation restricts to whom it may be shown.

FN10: “YouTube does not guarantee any confidentiality with respect to any User Submissions.”

FN11: The record shows that the provision of the Privacy Policy plaintiffs point to, which states that “Any videos that you submit to the YouTube Sites * * * may be viewed by the general public” refers to “personal information or video content that you voluntarily disclose online (on discussion boards, in messages and chat areas, within your playback or profile pages, etc.)” which “becomes publicly available.”

But the ECPA does not bar disclosure of non-content data about the private videos (e.g., the number of times each video has been viewed on YouTube.com or made accessible on a third-party website through an ‘embedded’ link to the video). Plaintiffs argue that such data are relevant to show whether videos designated private are in fact shared with numerous members of the public and therefore not protected by the ECPA, and to then obtain discovery on their claim (supported by evidence) FN12 that users abuse YouTube’s privacy feature “to share infringing videos with any interested member of the public while evading detection by content owners.” It is not clear from this record whether plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ECPA is correct, but their view is colorable, as the statute’s legislative history states that “a subscriber who places a communication on a computer ‘electronic bulletin board,’ with a reasonable basis for knowing that such communications are freely made available to the public, should be considered to have given consent to the disclosure or use of the communication.” Plaintiffs need the requested non-content data so that they can properly argue their construction of the ECPA on the merits and have an opportunity to obtain discovery of allegedly infringing private videos claimed to be public.

FN12: Plaintiffs submitted a snapshot of a YouTube user’s web page entitled “THE_RUGRATS_CHANNEL” which states “Disclaimer: Rugrats_and all Rugrats_related items are a copyright of Viacom” and on which the user states:

WELCOME TO MY_RUGRATS_PAGE. Previously rbt200, this is my new channel. The old one got deleted so I thought I’d start again, but this time, it’s JUST_RUGRATS! A whole channel dedicated to this fantastic cartoon! I will be posting whole episodes over the coming weeks so be sure to subscribe or add me as a friend because they might be set to private.

Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50614 at *25-30 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008 ) (internal citations removed).

Case Blurb: YouTube; Court Discusses Production of Database Schemas

Database Schemas

Plaintiffs seek the schemas for the “Google Advertising” and “Google Video Content” databases. FN7. A schema is an electronic index that shows how the data in a database are organized by listing the database’s fields and tables, but not its underlying data.

FN7 efendants have agreed to produce the schema for the “Claims” database.

A. Google Advertising Schema

Google earns most of its revenue from fees it charges advertisers to display advertisements on Google.com (the “AdWords” program) or on third party websites that participate in its “AdSense” program. Google stores data about each of the billions of advertising transactions made in connection with those programs in the Google Advertising database. The schema for that database “constitutes commercially sensitive information regarding Google’s advertising business”, the disclosure of which would permit others to profit without equivalent investment from the “years of refinement and thousands of person hours” of work Google spent selecting the numerous data points it tracks in connection with its advertising programs. Only trivial percentages of the fields and tables in the database “possibly relate to advertising revenue generated from advertisements run on YouTube,” and defendants have “already agreed to provide Plaintiffs with the small amount of YouTube-related data contained in the Google Advertising database.”

Plaintiffs argue that the schema is relevant to “show what Defendants could have or should have known about the extent to which their advertising revenues were associated with infringing content, and the extent to which Defendants had the ability to control, block or prevent advertising from being associated with infringing videos.”

However, given that plaintiffs have already been promised the only relevant data in the database, they do not need its confidential schema, which “itself provides a detailed to roadmap to how Google runs its advertising business,” to show whether defendants were on notice that their advertising revenues were associated with infringing videos, or that defendants decline to exercise their claimed ability to prevent such associations.

Therefore, the motion for production of the Google Advertising schema is denied.

B. Google Video Schema

By plaintiffs’ description the Google Video Content database stores “information Defendants collect regarding videos on the Google Video website, which is a video-sharing website, similar to YouTube, that is operated by Defendant Google.” The Google Video website has its own video library, but searches for videos on it will also access YouTube videos.

Plaintiffs argue that the schema for that database will reveal “The extent to which Defendants are aware of and can control infringements on Google Video” which “is in turn relevant to whether Defendants had ‘reason to know’ of infringements, or had the ability to control infringements, on YouTube, which they also own and which features similar content.” (plaintiffs’ italics). That states a sufficiently plausible showing that the schema is relevant to require its disclosure, there being no assertion that it is confidential or unduly burdensome to produce.

Therefore, the motion to compel production of the Google Video schema is granted.

Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50614 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008 ) (internal citations removed).

Case Blurb: YouTube; Court Grants Motion to Compel Production of 12 TB Database, Dismisses User’s Privacy Concerns

Video-Related Data from the Logging Database

Defendants’ “Logging” database contains, for each instance a video is watched, the unique “login ID” of the user who watched it, the time when the user started to watch the video, the internet protocol address other devices connected to the internet use to identify the user’s computer (“IP address”), and the identifier for the video. That database (which is stored on live computer hard drives) is the only existing record of how often each video has been viewed during various time periods. Its data can “recreate the number of views for any particular day of a video.” Plaintiffs seek all data from the Logging database concerning each time a YouTube video has been viewed on the YouTube website or through embedding on a third-party website.

They need the data to compare the attractiveness of allegedly infringing videos with that of non-infringing videos. A markedly higher proportion of infringing-video watching may bear on plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim, n3 and defendants’ substantial non-infringing use defense.

Defendants argue generally that plaintiffs’ request is unduly burdensome because producing the enormous amount of information in the Logging database (about 12 terabytes of data) “would be expensive and time-consuming, particularly in light of the need to examine the contents for privileged and work product material.”

But defendants do not specifically refute that “There is no need to engage in a detailed privilege review of the logging database, since it simply records the numbers of views for each video uploaded to the YouTube website, and the videos watched by each user.” While the Logging database is large, all of its contents can be copied onto a few “over-the-shelf” four-terabyte hard drives. Plaintiffs’ need for the data outweighs the unquantified and unsubstantiated cost of producing that information.

Defendants argue that the data should not be disclosed because of the users’ privacy concerns, saying that “Plaintiffs would likely be able to determine the viewing and video uploading habits of YouTube’s users based on the user’s login ID and the user’s IP address.”

But defendants cite no authority barring them from disclosing such information in civil discovery proceedings, FN5 and their privacy concerns are speculative. Defendants do not refute that the “login ID is an anonymous pseudonym that users create for themselves when they sign up with YouTube” which without more “cannot identify specific individuals, and Google has elsewhere stated:

We . . . are strong supporters of the idea that data protection laws should apply to any data that could identify you. The reality is though that in most cases, an IP address without additional information cannot.

FN5: The statute defendants point to, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (titled “Wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records”), prohibits video tape service providers from disclosing information on the specific video materials subscribers request or obtain, and in the case they cite, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com, 246 F.R.D. 570, 572-73 (W.D.Wis. 2007) (the “subpoena is troubling because it permits the government to peek into the reading habits of specific individuals without their prior knowledge or permission”), the court on First Amendment grounds did not require an internet book retailer to disclose the identities of customers who purchased used books from the grand jury’s target, a used book seller under investigation for tax evasion and wire and mail fraud in connection with his sale of used books through the retailer’s website.

Therefore, the motion to compel production of all data from the Logging database concerning each time a YouTube video has been viewed on the YouTube website or through embedding on a third-party website is granted.

Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50614 at *15-19 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008 ).

Case Blurb: YouTube; Court Grants Motion to Compel Videos “Removed” from Web Site

Removed Videos

Plaintiffs seek copies of all videos that were once available for public viewing on YouTube.com but later removed for any reason, or such subsets as plaintiffs designate. Plaintiffs claim that their direct access to the removed videos is essential to identify which (if any) infringe their alleged copyrights. Plaintiffs offer to supply the hard drives needed to receive those copies, which defendants store on computer hard drives.

Defendants concede that “Plaintiffs should have some type of access to removed videos in order to identify alleged infringements”, but propose to make plaintiffs identify and specify the videos plaintiffs select as probable infringers by use of data such as their titles and topics and a search program (which defendants have furnished) that gives plaintiffs the capacity both to run searches against that data and to view “snapshots” taken from each removed video. That would relieve defendants of producing all of the millions of removed videos, a process which would require a total of about five person-weeks of labor without unexpected glitches, as well as the dedication of expensive computer equipment and network bandwidth.

However, it appears that the burden of producing a program for production of all of the removed videos should be roughly equivalent to, or at least not significantly greater than, that of producing a program to create and copy a list of specific videos selected by plaintiffs.

While the total number of removed videos is intimidating (millions, according to defendants), the burden of inspection and selection, leading to the ultimate identification of individual “works-in-suit”, is on the plaintiffs who say they can handle it electronically.

Under the circumstances, the motion to compel production of copies of all removed videos is granted.

Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50614 at *13-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008 ) (internal citations removed).