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Archive for the 'Discovery Requests' Category


Case Blurb: Prof’l Basketball Club; Burden of proving objection to discovery requests falls to movant

Posted by rjbiii on March 11, 2008

In opposing discovery on the grounds of overbreadth, a party has the burden “to provide sufficient detail in terms of time, money and procedure required to produce the requested documents.” A “court must be able to ascertain what is being objected to. As such, unless it is obvious from the wording of the request itself that it is overbroad, vague, ambiguous or unduly burdensome, an objection simply stating so is not sufficiently specific.” A claim that answering discovery will require the objecting party to expend considerable time and effort to obtain the requested information is an insufficient factual basis for sustaining an objection.

Here, [Producing Party] has not explained why producing the emails at issue would be unnecessarily burdensome, but merely states that producing such emails “would increase the email universe exponentially[.]” PBC also states in its moving papers that the emails add “nothing to the case except mountains of work for no return.” But a bald assertion that discovery will be burdensome is insufficient in light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B). The Court is not permitted to presume the potential burdensome effects upon a party. The parties have already agreed upon a group of search terms that [Producing Party] previously used to search [key players'] emails and the Court assumes those terms may be used again to make further searches efficient.

City of Seattle v. Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC, 2008 WL 539809 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2008)(emphasis added)(citations removed).

Posted in 9th Circuit, Case Blurbs, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, FRCP 26(b), Judge Marsha Perchman, Objections to Discovery Requests, Overly Broad Request, Undue burden or cost, Vague Discovery Requests, W.D. Wash. | No Comments »

TX Case Blurb: Honza; Court addresses objection to discovery request based on revealing confidential information, court order

Posted by rjbiii on March 10, 2008

[Producing Party members] seek a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Honorable Greg Wilhelm, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, to set aside a discovery order requiring the Honzas to permit a forensic expert to create a mirror image of each of the computer hard drives in the Honzas’ office in an effort to locate two particular documents or iterations of those documents

The Honzas contend that Respondent abused his discretion because: (2) the order authorizes the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (3) the order authorizes the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to the Honzas’ other clients who have no connection to the underlying lawsuit.

The present discovery dispute originated with [Requesting Party's] motion to gain access to the Honzas’ computers, which was filed about one month before trial. By this motion, [Requesting Party] sought “[i]nformation (the ‘Metadata’) contained on the actual computers of the Defendants, such as any time stamps on the Relevant Documents, versions of the Relevant Documents, if any, as well as the deletion of various versions, if any.” [Requesting Party] explained that, although the Honzas responded to a prior request for production of relevant documents in their electronic version, “the Metadata was neither produced nor made available.”

[Ed. Testimony indicated the existence of relevant documents with respect to a another transaction apparently not addressed by earlier discovery requests]

[] [Requesting Party] sought discovery of relevant documents pertaining to the [newly revealed] transaction, and the [Producing Party] complied by providing pertinent written discovery.

[Requesting Party] seeks the metadata from the [Producing Party's] hard drives because it wants to identify the points in time when the partial assignment draft was modified in relation to the diary entry. This goes to the issue of whether [the Producing Party] altered the partial assignment after the parties concluded their agreement but before the document was presented for execution.

[Ed. The opinion then went on to list various Federal and State sources for persuasive authority in discovery law, especially with respect to ESI]

Privileged or Confidential Information

The [Producing Party] also contend[s] that the discovery order improperly authorizes the disclosure of (1) information protected by the attorney-client privilege and (2) confidential information pertaining to the Honzas’ other clients who have no connection to the underlying lawsuit.

Notwithstanding the “unlimited” access necessarily granted the forensic expert, Respondent’s order preserves any privileged or confidential information in several ways. First, the expert is limited in his search to two specific documents or iterations of those documents. [Members of the Producing Party] are then accorded the right to review the documents and information which the expert believes responsive and produce to [Requesting Party] only those documents and information which [members of the Producing Party] themselves believe are responsive. These provisions effectively preclude [Requesting Party] from having any access to documents or information pertaining to other clients of the Honzas not involved in this litigation.

Second, the order allows the [Producing Party executives] to withhold from discovery any documents or information which they claim to be privileged or confidential and provide instead a privilege log, subject to in camera review by Respondent.

Finally, the order provides that: (1) the observation of information by [Requesting Party] representatives during the imaging process shall not constitute a waiver of privilege or confidentiality; (2) all participants in the imaging process are subject to a protective order prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of information; and (3) [Requesting Party's] expert must provide proof of being bonded and of having commercial liability insurance by which the [Producing Party] may be “fully indemnified against any monetary loss.”

For these reasons, we hold that Respondent appropriately tailored the discovery order to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of privileged or confidential information and no abuse of discretion is shown.

[Ed. Note that a dissenting opinion is also entered by one of the Judges hearing the case. See the order itself for the full text of that dissent, or of the opinion itself.]

In re Honza, 2007 WL 4591917 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2007)

Posted in Case Blurbs, Computer Forensics, Data Collection, Data Custodians, Data Sources, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Objections to Discovery Requests, Privacy, Privilege, Privilege Log, Scope of Discovery, TX Judge Felipe Reyna, Texas | No Comments »

TX Case Blurb: Honza; Court addresses objection to ‘overly broad’ discovery requests, court order

Posted by rjbiii on March 10, 2008

[Producing Party members] seek a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Honorable Greg Wilhelm, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, to set aside a discovery order requiring the Honzas to permit a forensic expert to create a mirror image of each of the computer hard drives in the Honzas’ office in an effort to locate two particular documents or iterations of those documents

The Honzas contend that Respondent abused his discretion because: (1) the discovery order is overbroad and authorizes an improper “fishing expedition”;…

The present discovery dispute originated with [Requesting Party's] motion to gain access to the Honzas’ computers, which was filed about one month before trial. By this motion, [Requesting Party] sought “[i]nformation (the ‘Metadata’) contained on the actual computers of the Defendants, such as any time stamps on the Relevant Documents, versions of the Relevant Documents, if any, as well as the deletion of various versions, if any.” [Requesting Party] explained that, although the Honzas responded to a prior request for production of relevant documents in their electronic version, “the Metadata was neither produced nor made available.”

[Ed. Testimony indicated the existence of relevant documents with respect to a another transaction apparently not addressed by earlier discovery requests]

[] [Requesting Party] sought discovery of relevant documents pertaining to the [newly revealed] transaction, and the [Producing Party] complied by providing pertinent written discovery.

[Requesting Party] seeks the metadata from the [Producing Party's] hard drives because it wants to identify the points in time when the partial assignment draft was modified in relation to the diary entry. This goes to the issue of whether [the Producing Party] altered the partial assignment after the parties concluded their agreement but before the document was presented for execution.

[Ed. The opinion then went on to list various Federal and State sources for persuasive authority in discovery law, especially with respect to ESI]

Overbroad Discovery

The [Producing Party] first contend that the discovery order is overbroad and authorizes an improper “fishing expedition.” In this regard, they argue that Respondent improperly “gave blanket approval for [the Requesting Party] to gain total access to [their] computers and all information stored on them, whether or not it has anything to do with this lawsuit.”

Although it is true that Respondent’s order gives A & W’s forensic expert [FN8]complete access to all data stored on the Honzas’ computers, the order provides that the expert is to index all forensic images acquired from the imaging process “for the limited purpose of searching (the ‘Examination Process’) for two documents, previously Bates-labeled as HONZA 00019 and HONZA 00017, which are drafts of “Assignment of Contract” and any iterations (the ‘Relevant Documents’).” The expert must then compile any documents or information which the expert believes responsive and deliver them to the Honzas to determine for themselves which are responsive to A & W’s discovery request and which they choose to withhold, providing a privilege log instead.

In addition to limiting the expert’s search to two specific documents, the order provides that no waiver of privilege or confidentiality occurs if any otherwise privileged or confidential information is observed by A & W’s counsel or representatives during the imaging process, and they are prohibited from using such information other than in compliance with the terms of the order. The forensic expert is likewise prohibited from disclosing any information observed during the imaging process. And finally, the order requires the expert and all party representatives or counsel participating in the imaging process to sign an acknowledgment agreeing that they are subject to contempt of court for any violation of the order.

Any order requiring the imaging of a computer hard drive necessarily grants the expert who is conducting the imaging process access to all data on that hard drive. Here, Respondent specifically limited the expert’s search to two documents; gave the [Producing Party] a “right of first refusal” with regard to determining which documents or information are relevant to those two documents and responsive to [Requesting Party's] discovery request; imposed stringent limitations on inadvertent disclosures to prevent any unintended waiver of confidentiality or privilege; and placed all participants in the imaging process under a carefully drawn protective order.

Therefore, we do not agree with the Honzas’ contention that the discovery order is overbroad.

[Ed. Note that a dissenting opinion is also entered by one of the Judges hearing the case. See the order itself for the full text of that dissent, or of the opinion itself.]

In re Honza, 2007 WL 4591917 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2007)

Posted in Case Blurbs, Computer Forensics, Data Custodians, Data Sources, Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, Form of Production, Objections to Discovery Requests, Overly Broad Request, Privacy, Scope of Discovery, State Courts, TX Judge Felipe Reyna, Texas | No Comments »

Case Blurb: Benefirst; Good Cause Analysis-Seventh Factor

Posted by rjbiii on February 28, 2008

[Ed.-The court found that medical claim forms, requested by Plaintiff, would not be reasonably accessible. It then launched into an analysis to determine whether plaintiffs proved that “good cause” existed to compel production notwithstanding the accessibility issue. This blurb is from the analysis of seven factors. These are factors four and five: The likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; and Predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information;]

The parties resources.

While the Defendant has understandably engaged in a lengthy discussion of the cost of production, neither party has provided the court with any information about their resources. BeneFirst does represent that they no longer have a full time staff and that in order to retrieve the images that they would have to hire temporary help. At the same time, as previously noted, the Plaintiffs have significantly narrowed the breadth of their request and therefore, the time and cost for BeneFirst to produce the requested information should be significantly reduced.

Given the lack of information available to the Court, this factor is neutral.

W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007)

Posted in 1st Circuit, Case Blurbs, Cost Shifting, Cost of Discovery, D. Mass., Discovery Requests, Document Retention, Duty to Disclose, Duty to Produce, FRCP 26(b), Good Cause, Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman | No Comments »

Case Blurb: Benefirst; Good Cause Analysis-Fourth & Fifth Factors

Posted by rjbiii on December 28, 2007

[Ed.-The court found that medical claim forms, requested by Plaintiff, would not be reasonably accessible. It then launched into an analysis to determine whether plaintiffs proved that “good cause” existed to compel production notwithstanding the accessibility issue. This blurb is from the analysis of seven factors. These are factors four and five: The likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; and Predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information;]

I agree with the Plaintiffs that the requested claim forms and medical bills are clearly an integral part of the litigation; the requested information goes not only to BeneFirst’s culpability, but also to the amount of damages, if any, to which the Plaintiffs may be entitled. There can be no serious contention that the information is not highly relevant. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how this case could be prosecuted or defended without the claims forms and attendant bills. As previously found, they are not available from any other source (a determination which is uncontroverted).

These factors favor the Plaintiffs.

Posted in 1st Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Mass., Discovery Requests, Duty to Produce, FRCP 26(b), Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman, Relevance | No Comments »

Case Blurb: Benefirst; Good Cause Analysis-Two factors on redundancy and availability of data

Posted by rjbiii on December 28, 2007

[Ed.-The court found that medical claim forms, requested by Plaintiff, would not be reasonably accessible. It then launched into an analysis to determine whether plaintiffs proved that "good cause" existed to compel production notwithstanding the accessibility issue. This blurb is from the analysis of seven factors. These are factors two and three: The quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources; and The failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources.]

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is that BeneFirst mishandled their employees’ medical claims by failing to determine eligibility for payment, the availability of co-payment and co-insurance, and subrogation. The processing of the claim forms was presumably the mechanism for making these determinations. While the Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings are silent, the relevant time period appears to be from 2001 to 2004.*

*I so find because this litigation was commenced in 2005 and it seems safe to assume that none of the original claim forms and medical bills were still in existence at that time (if they were, BeneFirst presumably would have retained them).

According to BeneFirst, the original claim forms and medical bills were processed by hand, kept for 60 days, converted to a digital image and then destroyed. Therefore, digital images which constitute the information requested by the Plaintiffs are in the custody and control of BeneFirst and are not available through any other source.

These factors favor the Plaintiffs.

W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007)

Posted in 1st Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Mass., Discovery Requests, Document Retention, Duty to Preserve, Duty to Produce, FRCP 26(b), Good Cause, Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman, Unreasonably Cumulative | No Comments »

Case Blurb: Benefirst; Good Cause Analysis-Specificity of Discovery Request

Posted by rjbiii on December 28, 2007

[Ed.-The court found that medical claim forms, requested by Plaintiff, would not be reasonably accessible. It then launched into an analysis to determine whether plaintiffs proved that "good cause" existed to compel production notwithstanding the accessibility issue. This blurb is from the analysis of seven factors. This is the first factor: The specificity of the discovery request.]

BeneFirst’s Motion seeks reconsideration of this Court’s earlier discovery order which ordered BeneFirst to produce “all claims files, including the actual bills in BeneFirst’s possession or control.” The parties have responded intelligently and vigorously to this Order and there is no misunderstanding or confusion about the specificity of the information sought by the Plaintiffs.

This factor favors the Plaintiffs.

W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007)

Posted in 1st Circuit, Case Blurbs, D. Mass., Discovery Requests, FRCP 26(b), Good Cause, Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman | No Comments »

E-Discovery Pitfalls: Court dictates collections and search protocols

Posted by rjbiii on November 9, 2007

The latest in our series on e-discovery pitfalls.

K&L Gates has posted an opinion in which U.S. Magistrate Howard R. Lloyd dictates the collection and search protocols of a set of data over which the parties have become somewhat contentious. Let us begin with His Honor’s description of the dispute:

According to defendants, there are two hard drives in question. In July 2007, they reportedly made bit-for-bit copies of those hard drives (including recovered deleted files and fragments) and produced documents responsive to plaintiff’s requests. Plaintiff is skeptical about the production.

Well, the requesting party is always skeptical, isn’t it? What circumstances give merit to plaintiff’s suspicions?

[Plaintiff/Requesting Party] says that, to date, defendant Romi Mayder has produced only one email pertaining to his work at Silicon Test Systems, Inc. whereas Bob Pochowski, a third-party witness, has produced a host of documents (emails, data sheets, and the like) from Mayder that apparently were created during Mayder’s employment at Verigy.

Oops. This illustrates the dangers of working with highly distributable and “copyable” documents, such as e-mail, and not producing a full set (for whatever reason). Even in the days of paper, you never knew where all the copies might have been hiding. In this digital age of ours, with the ease of replication and distribution, the dangers are exponentially higher. So let us remember two things: do a good job on formulating an appropriate search protocol; and, of course, never deliberately exclude relevant documents not subject to privilege from production. But the court isn’t finished with plaintiff’s suspicions.

Verigy also contends that other documents produced to date demonstrate Mayder’s willingness to manipulate evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that, when defendant Mayder left plaintiff’s employ, a system or software upgrade was performed which may have deleted files from defendants’ hard drives.

So now they walk beyond the line of suggesting the producing party could have accidentally failed to produce, but suggest defendant is indifferent with respect to its obligation to produce, or that it even purposefully manipulates data to protect itself. This serves to illustrate the importance of following a defensible, documented collection plan. The documentation may serve to refute allegations of impropriety or mismanagement. The importance of retaining a third party to execute the collection process is also on point, as such an expert tends to lend an objective voice to any dispute over procedure.

Now, this next bit is interesting, and potentially really bad for the defendant.

[Requesting Party] argues that it needs to conduct additional discovery of those hard drives, not only to determine whether any relevant documents have been withheld from defendants’ production, but also to examine what may have happened on the hard drives and why.

The requesting party wants to examine the drives to see if defendants failed in their responsibilities. The request is not made merely for the sake of satisfying their curiosity. The possibility that such intrusive measures might be allowed should be a warning shot over the bow for any party engaged in discovery. Make sure your processes are thorough, managed competently, well documented, and defensible.

[Producing Party does] not dispute that a system or software upgrade was performed which may have deleted files from their hard drives. However, they maintain that all deleted files have been recovered and preserved and that they have produced all information responsive to plaintiff’s requests.

All deleted files have been recovered? That’s far from certain, especially with respect to an operation as extensive as a software upgrade. The percentage of deleted files forensically recovered is based on many factors. Was “wiping” involved? If not, has the drive been defragmented? What is the “data turnover” (number of files deleted vs. number of new files written to the drive) of the drive at issue? Under only a very limited set of circumstances might one be able to say with any semblance of certainty that every single deleted file was recovered. As we see, the judge doesn’t appear convinced either. Upon considering the arguments, the court sets a two-tiered plan into place.

Defendants propose a two-tier protocol which (a) permits discovery in areas that defendants deem presumptively relevant; and (b) allows plaintiff to request that the expert conduct other searches, subject to an opportunity by defendant to review and object to the proposed search requests.

Defendants sought to protect themselves from abuse:

Defendants express concern that plaintiff will propound unduly burdensome or otherwise abusive searches beyond the scope of permissible discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26. At the motion hearing, it was suggested, somewhat facetiously, that Verigy might attempt to request a search for all documents with the letter “A.” Indeed, documents submitted on supplemental briefing indicate that Verigy apparently has previously requested a search for all documents containing the letter “V” (see Pasquinelli Decl., Ex. C)–a request which strikes this court as being patently overbroad.

In an interesting note, the requesting party argued that disclosure of additional search terms it wanted to use might infringe attorney work product. The court, however, was not persuaded.
In concluding its opinion, the court felt the urge to remind counsel and the parties of their duties under the law:

Although it should go without saying, the parties are admonished to proceed in good faith and to refrain from conduct designed to unnecessarily encumber or retard discovery or to impose unnecessary expense or burden on the opposing parties or the court.

To reiterate the lessons of the case: engage in an honest, thorough, and well documented discovery plan; think about retaining a third party to serve as an objective, knowledgeable voice; and scrutinize the implementation of processes (such as software upgrades) that endanger the integrity of the litigation hold.

Posted in 9th Circuit, Case Summary, Computer Forensics, Discovery Requests, Motion to Compel, N.D. Cal., Search Protocols | No Comments »

Computer system ‘not conducive’ to keyword search?

Posted by rjbiii on November 8, 2007

In reading 3M v. Kanbar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78374 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007), an opinion posted at the Electronic Discovery Blog, we ran across this passage:

Upon reviewing the emails produced, the court appreciates 3M’s concern. However, given the assertions by Rollit’s counsel, compelling another search will not cure the problems inherent in a manual search. FN3 Therefore, the court orders (each) Defendant to sign a declaration certifying that all non-privileged, responsive documents have been produced.
The declaration shall detail what Rollit (and each other defendant) and its employees have done to ensure a complete production. Given the concern over the previous omission, Defendant(s) would do well to ensure that all responsive documents have been produced before signing. Accordingly, the motion as it pertains to compelling another search is GRANTED IN PART. The declarations shall be filed with the court within 7 days of the date of this order.

FN3: It does not seem that Rollit’s computer system is conducive to an order compelling an electronic keyword search.

(emphasis added)

I wonder to what unique attributes the court refers when it states that “Rollit’s computer system is [not] conducive to an order compelling an electronic keyword search?” There is no elaboration, but I would love to see what factors convinced the court of this…

Posted in 9th Circuit, Discovery Requests, N.D. Cal., Search Protocols | No Comments »

Definitions of “Document” and “Communications” included in discovery requests

Posted by rjbiii on October 18, 2007

I’ve just read an opinion highlighted by The Electronic Discovery Blog, where a paper production was found to be insuffient, so the court ordered a production in electronic format. The opinion notes that the discovery request included a definition of the terms “document” and “communications:”

“Communications” means any transmittal of information in any form or format, whether oral, written, or electronic, including, without limitation, all correspondence, inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations and message logs, letters, notes, memoranda, telegrams, faxes, emails, or recordings. It is understood that all categories of documents described above shall include with respect thereto all communications as defined, whether or not expressly stated. The production of electronic communications should be accompanied by a description of the software and technology used to prepare the communications and needed to read them.

The term “document” means all writings of any kind, including the originals and all nonidentical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any notation made on such copies or otherwise (including without limitation, correspondence, e-mail, memoranda, notes, diaries, statistics,
checks, statements, receipts, returns, summaries, pleadings, affidavits, depositions, pamphlets, books, prospectuses, inter-office and intra-office communications, offer notations of any sort of conversations, telephone calls, meetings or other communications, bulletins, printed matter, computer printouts, information contained in any computer although not yet printed in hard copy, teletypes, telefax, invoices, worksheets, and all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and amendments of any of the foregoing), graphic or oral records or representations of any kind, (including without
limitations, photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotape, recordings, motion pictures) and electronic, mechanical or electrical records or representations of any kind, (including without limitations, tapes, cassettes, discs, recordings).

John B. v. Goetz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75457 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2007) (emphasis in the opinion).

We just posted about an article on CNet describing how the definition of the term “document” has been expanded. I do have an issue with defining a document (as is done above) as “information contained in any computer although not yet printed in hard copy.” That seems rather nebulous. A document, I believe, is a coherent unit of information that may consist of a single file (a simple Word or Adobe file) or may consist of multiple files (an html page that includes images and the like separately, or a Word file that links to graphs and spreadsheets).

Posted in Discovery, Discovery Requests, EDD Basics, EDD Processing | No Comments »