Case Blurb: Prof’l Basketball Club; Burden of proving objection to discovery requests falls to movant

In opposing discovery on the grounds of overbreadth, a party has the burden “to provide sufficient detail in terms of time, money and procedure required to produce the requested documents.” A “court must be able to ascertain what is being objected to. As such, unless it is obvious from the wording of the request itself that it is overbroad, vague, ambiguous or unduly burdensome, an objection simply stating so is not sufficiently specific.” A claim that answering discovery will require the objecting party to expend considerable time and effort to obtain the requested information is an insufficient factual basis for sustaining an objection.

Here, [Producing Party] has not explained why producing the emails at issue would be unnecessarily burdensome, but merely states that producing such emails “would increase the email universe exponentially[.]” PBC also states in its moving papers that the emails add “nothing to the case except mountains of work for no return.” But a bald assertion that discovery will be burdensome is insufficient in light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B). The Court is not permitted to presume the potential burdensome effects upon a party. The parties have already agreed upon a group of search terms that [Producing Party] previously used to search [key players'] emails and the Court assumes those terms may be used again to make further searches efficient.

City of Seattle v. Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC, 2008 WL 539809 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2008)(emphasis added)(citations removed).

Case Blurb: Prof’l Basketball Club; Court discusses scope of duty to preserve

Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a)(1)(A) allows a party to serve on any other party a request for relevant electronically stored information in the “responding party’s possession, custody, or control.”Only one of these requirements need be met. Legal ownership over the electronically stored information is not determinative, nor is possession necessary if the party has custody or control over the items. Further, “[c]ontrol is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand.” Documents may be within the “custody” or “control” of a party even thought they are in the possession of nonparties. A legal right is evaluated in light of the facts of each case, but central to each case is the relationship between the person having actual possession of the document and the party or the transaction at issue. A legal right to obtain upon demand electronic information can also be established by the existence of a principal-agent relationship.

City of Seattle v. Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC, 2008 WL 539809 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2008)(emphasis added)(citations removed).

Case Summary: Bunnell; Terminating Sanctions and Default Judgment appropriate for Willful, Systemic Spoliation

In this copyright infringement case, the court held that terminating sanctions and the entry of default judgment in favor of the requesting party was appropriate the court found:

• User forum postings had been systematically reviewed for the purpose of modifying or deleting those which referred to acts associated with copyright infringement;
• Directory headings where copyrighted content was stored was changed from specific names of television shows to more generalized names (e.g., “TV-Unsorted”).
• Evidence suggested that [Producing Party] may have failed to produce previously existing, unaltered versions of these directories.
• Producing Party failed to produce, and claimed not to possess, the full IP addresses related to clients downloading works protected by copyright laws, where evidence suggested that the party did in fact have this information.
• Producing party failed to produce names of forum moderators, as required.

Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007) (Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions)

Case Blurb: Bunnell; Deleting and modifying user forum postings constitutes willful spoliation

[Requesting Parties] claim that [Producing Parties] responded to the filing of this lawsuit with a plan to delete and modify “hundreds or thousands” of postings on [Producing Party's] forums whose content included references to copyright infringement (the issue in the case).

Forum postings were modified to replace the names of copyrighted works with, for example, “[some movie 1]” and “[some movie 2].” Two forum threads were deleted entirely: a thread on how to “crack” or bypass the copyright security on electronic games and a glossary of terms like CAM, TS, DVDSCR, and Telecine (terms referring to methods of copying content).

This process was implemented to “clean up” the site in response to the lawsuit, with an eye to avoiding future complaints of copyright infringement. [Producing Party] claims that it assumed [Requesting Party] had already seen the existing forum postings. Thus, its intention was not to destroy evidence but to “steer clear of anything related to piracy.” This contention is simply not believable. The destruction of evidence clearly relevant on the issue of copyright infringement cannot be justified by the assumption that it’s already been viewed by [Requesting Party].

Most piracy-related threads were closed and removed from public view, leaving their content intact, rather than modified.

Vbulletin, the software [Producing Party] uses to operate the forums, “does not save material which has been edited from the post.”

Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007) (Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions)

Case Blurb: NSA Telecom Records Litigation; Discussing Preservation of Relevant Data

The duty [to preserve] extends to documents, data and tangible things in the possession, custody and control of the parties to this action…

“Preservation” is to be interpreted broadly to accomplish the goal of maintaining the integrity of all documents, data and tangible things reasonably anticipated to be subject to discovery under FRCP 26, 45 and 56(e) in this action. Preservation includes taking reasonable steps to prevent the partial or full destruction, alteration, testing, deletion, shredding, incineration, wiping, relocation, migration, theft, or mutation of such material, as well as negligent or intentional handling that would make material incomplete or inaccessible.

Case Blurb: NSA Telecom Records Litigation; What items are covered by the duty to preserve?

The duty extends to documents, data and tangible things in the possession, custody and control of the parties to this action…

“Documents, data and tangible things” is to be interpreted broadly to include writings, records, files, correspondence, reports, memoranda, calendars, diaries, minutes, electronic messages, voicemail, e-mail, telephone message records or logs, computer and network activity logs, hard drives, backup data, removable computer storage media such as tapes, disks and cards, printouts, document image files, web pages, databases, spreadsheets, software, books, ledgers, journals, orders, invoices, bills, vouchers, checks, statements, worksheets, summaries, compilations, computations, charts, diagrams, graphic presentations, drawings, films, digital or chemical process photographs, video, phonographic, tape or digital recordings or transcripts thereof, drafts, jottings and notes. Information that serves to identify, locate, or link such material, such as file inventories, file folders, indices and metadata, is also included in this definition.

In re Nat’l. Security Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 2007 WL 3306579 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2007)

Case Blurb; NSA Telecom Records Litigation; Duty to Preserve Discussed

The duty [to preserve relevant data] extends to documents, data and tangible things in the possession, custody and control of the parties to this action, and any employees, agents, contractors, carriers, bailees or other non-parties who possess materials reasonably anticipated to be subject to discovery in this action. Counsel are under an obligation to exercise efforts to identify and notify such non-parties, including employees of corporate or institutional parties.

In re Nat’l. Security Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 2007 WL 3306579 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2007)

Case Blurb: Levi Strauss; Court discusses ‘duty’ to electronically re-produce paper production

Plaintiffs contend that it is “black-letter law” that LS & Co. is obliged to now re-produce its entire [paper] document production in electronic form. However, the cases they cite merely acknowledge the principle that electronically stored information falls within the definition of “document” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. See, e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1382-83 (7th Cir.1993) (“[T]he Advisory Committee notes to the 1970 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 make clear that computer data is included in Rule 34’s description of documents.”); Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“Electronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper records.”); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1053 (S.D.Cal.1999) (“The Court finds that by requesting ‘documents’ under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, Plaintiff also effectively requested production of information stored in electronic form.”).

LS & Co. has cited some authority (albeit, one case is unpublished) indicating that, under the former version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, it was not obliged to produce its documents in electronic and hard copy form. See India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D.Wis.2006) (“A party may request information in a specific electronic format, but if it instead simply asks for ‘documents,’ adopting the definition in Rule 34(a), production in electronic format is not required.”); Northern Crossarm Co., Inc. v. Chemical Specialties, Inc., No. 03-C-415-C, 2004 WL 635606 *1 (W.D.Wis., Mar.3, 2004) (“If a party produces its electronic information in a hard copy format that mimics the manner in which that information is stored electronically, then that party has not disobeyed Rule 34.”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, as amended, now allows a party to “specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.”FED.R.CIV.P. 34(b). However, plaintiffs do not seem to contend that those amendments apply here. At any rate, the amended Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 provides that where, as here, “a request does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically stored information,” then “a responding party must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.”FED.R.CIV.P. 34(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Further, unless the parties agree or the court otherwise orders, “a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.”FED.R.CIV.P. 34(b)(iii).

Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 2007 WL 2688467 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007) (Do not cite).

Case Summary: Lakeside School; Court lays out procedure for examining employee’s hard drive

In this employee discrimination case, defendant Lakeside School sought a court order allowing inspection of a hard drive from a laptop belonging to the school, but which had been assigned for use to plaintiff for use in the discharge of his duties while employed at the school. The employee argued that some information on the laptop was covered by attorney-client and marital privilege.

The court ruled that in general, the employee had no expectation of privacy for communications made on the laptop belonging to his employer: he had signed a document indicating that he had read the school’s employee handbook containing a policy allowing the school to inspect any computer it furnishes its employees; any communications made using the e-mail accounts provided by the school similarly was bereft of any expectation of privacy. However, the court ruled that “web based” e-mails made on the computer, communicating with employee’s spouse or attorney, were covered by privilege.

I”m guessing here that the term “web based e-mails” means that the employee had an e-mail account, with an ISP that was not associated with the school (like Yahoo or Hotmail), and that he used his business laptop to access and use those accounts. These are what the court protected.

Another interesting facet of the decision is that, in the absence of an agreed protocol by the parties, the court dictated the procedure the parties would use for inspection of the hard drive. The court allowed the school’s suggested procedure:

Lakeside would be willing to have its own expert, at its own expense [ ], provide both parties’ counsel with a list of files (deleted and active) from Mr. Sims’ computer … Plaintiffs’ counsel can then identify any files they believe are privileged, as well as the nature of the privilege being asserted. Lakeside will then review any remaining files over which no claim of privilege is made, and will determine whether any of plaintiffs’ privilege designations should be challenged.

K&L Gates has their own summary here, and a copy of the opinion here (MS Word format).

Sims v. Lakeside School, 2007 WL 2745367 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007)

Case Blurb: Hawaiian Airlines; Factors to Consider before Imposing a Default or Dismissal Sanction

A default or dismissal sanction can be imposed only based upon a finding of willfulness, fault, or bad faith. In addition, the court should consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.

A list of factors like this one “amounts to a way for a district judge to think about what to do, not a series of conditions precedent before the judge can do anything, and not a script for making what the district judge does appeal proof.”

In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 2007 WL 3172642 (Bkrtcy. D.Hawaii October 30, 2007).